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This dissertation examines how caregiving for an elderly parent affects an adult
child’s labor supply and wages.
In the first chapter (co-authored with Courtney H. Van Houtven and Norma B.
Coe) we identify the relationship between informal care and labor force participa-
tion in the United States, both on the intensive and extensive margins, and examine
wage effects. We control for time-invariant individual heterogeneity; rule out or
control for endogeneity; examine effects for men and women separately; and analyze
heterogeneous effects by task and intensity. We find modest decreases—1.4-2.4 per-
centage points—in the likelihood of working for caregivers providing personal care.
Male and female chore caregivers, meanwhile, are more likely to retire. For female
care providers who remain working, we find evidence that they decrease work by
3-10 hours per week and face a 2.3-2.6 percent wage penalty. We find little effect
of caregiving on working men’s hours or wages except for a wage premium for male
intensive caregivers.
In the second chapter I formulate and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model
of elder parent care and work to analyze how caregiving affects a woman’s current
and future labor force participation and wages. Intertemporal tradeoffs, such as de-
creased future earning capacity due to a current reduction in labor market work, are
central to the decision to provide care. The existing literature, however, overlooks
such long-term considerations. I depart from the previous literature by modeling
caregiving and work decisions in an explicitly intertemporal framework. The model
incorporates dynamic elements such as the health of the elderly parent, human
capital accumulation and job offer availability. I estimate the model on a sample of
women from the Health and Retirement Study by efficient method of moments. The
estimates indicate that intertemporal tradeoffs matter considerably. In particular,
women face low probabilities of returning to work or increasing work hours after a
caregiving spell. Using the estimates, I simulate several government sponsored elder
care policy experiments: a longer unpaid leave than currently available under the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; a paid work leave; and a caregiver allowance.
The leaves encourage more work among intensive care providers since they guarantee
a woman can return to her job, while the caregiver allowance discourages work. A
comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows that half the value
of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave, and the caregiver allowance
generates gains comparable to the unpaid leave.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Informal Care on
Work and Wages
1.1 Introduction
The population of disabled elderly is large and growing fast, and the care they
receive is often informal care from family and friends. For elderly parents, adult
children are the most common type of care providers. Furthermore, adult children
are predicted to be an increasingly important source of informal care as the Baby
Boomer generation ages, the number of divorcees increases, and the differential life
expectancy between men and women results in a larger number of widowed elderly
women. Given that a typical adult child caregiver is in her late 50s or early 60s,
and still in her working years, providing care for an elderly parent may involve con-
siderable opportunity costs.
Caregiving could affect work behavior on the extensive and/or intensive margin.
Changes in the extensive margin include quitting work temporarily or retiring early.
Changes in the intensive margin include reducing work hours, taking on fewer re-
sponsibilities, or forgoing a promotion to fulfill caregiving obligations (Carmichael
and Charles 2003). Both margins are important, with potential implications for
current earnings and retirement income that could affect quality of life long after
1
the caregiving episode ends.
The labor market consequences associated with informal care are important for
understanding how the costs of long-term care are distributed among the govern-
ment and the family. In the United States, long-term care is one of the largest
uninsured risks facing the elderly; only about 15 percent of those 65 and older have
private insurance which provides some, albeit capped, coverage;1 Medicare finances
only short-term nursing home stays and limited home health care; and, Medicaid
provides catastrophic insurance once individuals spend down their assets. This
piecemeal and incomplete insurance, combined with the high out-of-pocket costs of
care, often leads individuals to rely on informal care from family and friends instead
of paid market care. Feeling the pinch of these health costs, governments have de-
vised and promoted policies, such as cash benefits and tax credits, that explicitly
aim to reduce government long-term care expenditures by encouraging the elderly
to remain in the community, presumably relying on informal care. Evaluating the
labor market costs of informal care provision is especially relevant for the sustain-
ability, design and implementation of policies that encourage informal care provision
as well as understanding the total costs and benefits of such programs.
Although there is a substantial literature trying to estimate the causal relation-
ship between caregiving and work, it suffers from three main concerns. The most
significant methodological issue is whether there is an endogeneity problem that
leads to biased estimates of the causal effect of informal care on work. Adult chil-
dren who have poor labor market opportunities or less attachment to the labor force
may be more likely to become caregivers, creating a selection bias in reduced-form
estimates. Much of the older literature ignores the problem; newer work tries a
variety of different estimation methods to address endogeneity and draws mixed
conclusions about its existence. Second, much of the recent longitudinal literature
has focused on Europe, leaving it an open question as to how informal care affects
work in the United States when controlling for permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
The United States has a relatively less generous welfare state than in Europe, less
1Authors’ calculations from the 2010 survey wave of the Health and Retirement Study.
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generous public pension coverage, health insurance that is often tied to work under
age 65, and typically higher levels of female labor market participation. For all of
these reasons, European findings may not be generalizable to the U.S. context, and
may indeed be an upper-bound. Third, the literature has yet to reach a consensus.
Much of the literature looks at either the extensive or intensive work margin, or
measures the impact on wages, but does not measure all three margins of adjust-
ment.2 Given the lack of consensus about the impact caregiving has on work and
wages, it is very difficult to pool estimates across papers to have a comprehensive
and cohesive picture of the impact caregiving has on labor market outcomes.
This paper strives to fill this gap in the literature. Specifically, we identify the
causal relationship between informal care and various labor market outcomes using a
U.S. longitudinal sample of nationally representative prime age working individuals.
We examine both the intensive and extensive margins of work and whether there
are wage effects from informal care, separately for men and women. Furthermore,
we control for time-invariant individual heterogeneity via fixed effects, allowing for
individual characteristics such as taste for caregiving or attachment to the labor
force that may impact both caregiving and work behavior, and we test for remain-
ing endogeneity after including fixed effects. We also distinguish between the types
of care being provided—chore assistance versus personal care, or intensive care, as
measured by hours. Understanding the differential effects of care across these do-
mains is important for structuring long-term care policies and for better targeting
caregiver supports, such as respite care services. Lastly, we look beyond the tradi-
tional labor outcomes examined in this literature to consider whether informal care
affects a person’s (self-reported) retirement. Such analysis informs about the po-
tential impact of informal care on retirement financial security and Social Security
benefits. A comprehensive approach like ours has been lacking in U.S. studies, and
is important for understanding the full costs of elder parent care. By considering the
total costs of informal care against the government expenditures saved in paid home
2The one exception in Europe, Bolin et al. (2008), analyzes all three margins using one survey
wave of data.
3
care and nursing home costs, policy-makers can better evaluate the cost-effectiveness
and overall sustainability of policies aimed to keep the elderly in the community.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 describes the existing literature.
Section 1.3 presents the empirical strategy and models. Section 1.4 provides de-
tails about the data, sample selection criteria, and outcome measures. Section 1.5
presents the main results: informal care’s effect on labor force participation, retire-
ment, and hours of work and wages conditional on working. Section 1.5 also presents
the robustness and sensitivity analysis, and Section 1.6 concludes that there is inter-
esting heterogeneity in the labor market response to informal care provision based
on the type and intensity of care provided as well as the gender of the care provider.
Our estimates suggest that personal care provision causes some care providers to
stop working while chore care provision leads some care providers to partially or
fully retire. Interestingly, female chore care providers that work significantly cut
back their work hours and experience wage penalties, while we find much less of an
impact on the hours or wages of male care providers who work.
1.2 Background
Ex ante, it is not clear what effect caregiving will have on work. Time being
scarce, caregivers may reduce work hours or exit employment in response to the
informal care needs of a parent. However, caregivers may instead decrease their
leisure time and maintain their labor force attachment due to financial considera-
tions, such as employer-sponsored health insurance, or because it provides a break
from caregiving (Carmichael and Charles 2003, Wilson et al. 2007). In addition,
the impact of informal care on labor market outcomes may vary with the type of
care being provided. For example, providing help with personal activities such as
eating, bathing, or dressing may require a larger time commitment than providing
assistance with chores. Some care tasks such as assistance with chores are shiftable
over the day or even in between days, while personal care seems to contain un-
shiftable activities that need to be provided at specific times in the day. There may
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be opportunity costs associated not only with a larger time commitment, but also
from non-shiftable caregiving tasks (Hassink and Van den Berg 2011). Thus, we
distinguish between types of care in our analysis, as well as the intensity of care
provided.
The literature analyzing the relationship between caregiving and work is quite
extensive, using a variety of datasets, country and institutional settings, and cross-
section and longitudinal estimation methods. However, this long literature has not
led to a consensus about the causal relationship between these two activities. Most
studies have found a negative relationship between informal care provision and the
extensive margin of work (Bolin et al. 2008, Crespo and Mira 2010, Ettner 1995,
Heitmueller 2007, Pavalko and Artis 1997).3 There is less consensus concerning
whether caregivers who remain in the labor force reduce their work hours. Bolin
et al. (2008), Casado-Mar´ın et al. (2011), and Wolf and Soldo (1994) find little
evidence of caregiving reducing work hours, while Ettner (1996) and Johnson and
LoSasso (2000) find caregivers in the US do reduce their work hours. In addition,
some studies have found evidence of wage penalties (Carmichael and Charles 2003,
Heitmueller and Inglis 2007), foregone promotions, and losses in pension entitle-
ments (Parker 1985) from providing informal care. The European literature finds
substantial heterogeneity of the impact of caregiving on work, namely that the effect
tends to be stronger for intensive caregivers (Carmichael and Charles 1998, 2003,
Casado-Mar´ın et al. 2011, Heitmueller 2007, Spiess and Schneider 2003).4 Coresi-
dential caregiving has stronger negative effects on work in Europe (Casado-Mar´ın
et al. 2011, Heitmueller 2007, Heitmueller et al. 2010), whereas Ettner (1996) found
only non-coresidential female caregivers experience significant short-term negative
3Wolf and Soldo (1994) is a notable exception which finds no evidence of informal care reducing
the propensity of married women to be employed in the U.S.
4These studies define intensive caregivers by the hours of care provided per week or month.
However, the data we use only records the hours of care at two-year intervals, making it particularly
difficult to identify intensive caregivers in a way that is directly comparable to previous work. We use
the type of care given—personal care versus chore care—as a measure of the commitment provided
by the child, and the number of hours of care over a two-year interval to create a threshold variable
of intensity.
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work effects in the United States.5 Some studies find stronger work effects for women
caregivers compared to men (Carmichael and Charles 2003, Do 2008) while others
do not (Bolin et al. 2008, Johnson and LoSasso 2006).
To our knowledge, Dentinger and Clarkberg (2002) is the only study that ex-
amines how informal care affects the transition to retirement. They find that wives
caring for husbands have retirement odds five times greater than non-caregiving
women, but find little evidence that men or women caring for parents or parents-
in-law experience faster transitions to retirement. However, their sample is of 763
pension-eligible pre-Baby Boom men and women. They caution against generaliz-
ing their findings to all women from these cohorts or the experiences of the Baby
Boomers since their sample is not nationally or cohort representative, with a sample
that is biased in favor of women who have the strongest attachment to the labor
force. Our approach accounts for such attachment by controlling for permanent un-
observed heterogeneity. Furthermore, we examine whether there are heterogeneous
effects of care provision on retirement by the type and intensity of care provided.
Overall, it is hard to discern from the literature the total impact of caregiving on
work behavior of American caregivers. Almost all U.S. studies use cross-sectional
data and cannot control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity.6 In addition,
international experience cannot readily be generalized to the United States.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
We analyze several labor market outcomes of the adult children, including the
probability of working for pay, the probability of being retired, and weekly hours
of work and logged hourly wages conditional on working. Generally, we write the
5We do not have a large enough sample of coresidential caregivers to test for heterogeneity of
the effect for that subgroup of caregivers. Our results are not sensitive to whether we include
coresidential caregivers or not.
6Johnson and LoSasso (2000) is an exception in the United States. They estimate a random
effects model on two waves of Health and Retirement Study data and focus on the effect of informal
care on work hours.
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labor market outcomes as
yit = f(CGit,Xit, δi, "it) (1.1)
where yit is the labor market outcome of interest for individual i at time t; CGit
is a measure of informal care, which we will define in several ways; Xit, is a vector
of demographic, socioeconomic, and work variables which varies depending on the
outcome of interest; δi is a time-invariant, individual-specific error component; and
"it is an individual- and time-varying error component. We model the time-invariant
individual unobserved heterogeneity as a fixed effect; that is, we allow δi to be
correlated with CGit and Xit. The fixed effect captures individual characteristics
such as a taste for caregiving or labor market attachment that may impact both
caregiving and work behavior.7 There may be concern, however, that the individual-
and time-varying error, "it, is correlated with our measure of caregiving, CGit.8 To
address this potential endogeneity problem, we propose a vector of instruments,
Zit, that are correlated with our measure of caregiving, corr(CGit,Zit) "= 0, and are
uncorrelated with the individual and time-varying error component, corr("it,Zit) =
0. The instruments must be time-varying themselves or their effect will be captured
in the fixed effect. We discuss the endogeneity concerns in more detail in Section
1.3.2.
1.3.1 Model Specification
For the labor force participation and self-reported retirement specifications, we
model those outcomes as linear probability models with fixed effects.9 The model
7For example, an adult child with strong family attachment may tend to work fewer hours and
provide more informal care than adult children with relatively weak family attachments. Those
who are especially diligent may devote more hours to work and care provision than adult children
who are less industrious.
8Even after controlling for the “type” of person via the fixed effect, there may be remaining
time-varying shocks that also could influence both caregiving and work, such as getting fired or
experiencing a wage cut or increase.
9While the logit specification is a rare exception amongst non-linear models in that coefficients
can be conditionally consistently estimated in the presence of fixed effects, it does not provide
estimates of the individual fixed effects which are needed to compute statistics of interest such as
(average) partial effects (Wooldridge 2002). We prefer the linear probability models since we can
7
is formalized as
LFPit = α1CGit + α2Xit + δi + "it (1.2)
where LFPit is equal to one if person i is working (or retired in the retirement
models) at time t. We estimate the model first treating informal care as exogenous,
under the assumption that E("it|CGit,Xit, δi) = 0, such that
E(LFPit|CGit,Xit, δi) = Pr(LFPit = 1|CGit,Xit, δi) = α1CGit+α2Xit+ δi (1.3)
We then estimate the model treating informal care as endogenous using a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) with fixed effects approach. We instrument informal
care with our vector of time-varying instruments, Zit, under the assumptions that
corr(CGit,Zit) "= 0 and E("it|Zit) = 0.
For the hours of work and log wage specifications, we model those outcomes as
linear regressions with fixed effects conditional on working. The model is formalized
as
yit = α1CGit + α2Xit + δi + "it for LFPit = 1 (1.4)
where yit is either hours of work per week or the logged hourly wage. We estimate
the model first treating informal care as exogenous, under the assumption that
E("it|LFPit = 1, CGit,Xit, δi) = 0, such that
E(yit|LFPit = 1, CGit,Xit, δi) = α1CGit + α2Xit + δi (1.5)
We then estimate the model treating informal care as endogenous using a 2SLS with
fixed effects approach. We instrument informal care with our vector of time-varying
instruments, Zit, under the assumptions described above. Since the hours of work
and wage regressions are estimated only on those who work, we control for selection
into work to the extent that selection is on individual time-invariant characteristics
that will be captured in the fixed effect. If selection into work depends on individual
estimate partial effects, and we can straightforwardly perform the instrumental variables analysis
with two-stage least squares.
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and time-varying unobservables, then the impact of caregiving on hours of work or
wages we find, αˆ1, also includes the impact via selection into work.
1.3.2 Endogeneity Concerns
Most studies using instrumental variables techniques with cross-sectional data
are not able to reject exogeneity of informal care with respect to work (Bolin et al.
2008, Casado-Mar´ın et al. 2011, Heitmueller 2007) or can reject exogeneity only at
borderline significance levels (Johnson and LoSasso 2006). However, some of the
instruments are weak (Bolin et al. 2008, Heitmueller 2007) or their own exogeneity
has been called into question (for example, distance between parents and children or
lagged work status). Some studies use other techniques to address the issue, includ-
ing simultaneous equations methods (Crespo 2006, Wolf and Soldo 1994), lags and
leads of caregiving (Heitmueller 2007), or dynamic panel data methods (Casado-
Mar´ın et al. 2011, Heitmueller et al. 2010).
The nature of the endogeneity concern in our analysis is different than in these
past studies. The previous longitudinal studies address the potential endogeneity
of informal care by allowing for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, usually
via random effects estimation, which assumes that the individual-specific hetero-
geneity is independent of informal care and other explanatory variables. Our study
allows for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects, which allows for
correlation between the individual-specific heterogeneity and informal care. How-
ever, endogeneity may still be a concern if the time-varying error is correlated with
time-varying caregiving behavior even after controlling for permanent unobserved
heterogeneity via fixed effects.
To address the potential endogeneity concern, we propose a set of time-varying
instruments that are correlated with informal care provision but are assumed to
be uncorrelated with the individual and time-varying error component of the labor
market outcome equations. The identifying instruments we use measure parental
health, broadly defined, such as having a parent or in-law who needs help perform-
ing activities of daily living (ADLs), who has a memory problem, or who cannot
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be left alone, and whether a parent or in-law has recently passed away or become
widowed. The instruments are theoretically sound. Variation in the health of a
parent or in-law should directly vary the demand for informal care, but not directly
affect work behavior of an adult child other than through the informal care path.
Concerns about intergenerational transmission of poor health should be alleviated
by the fact that we control for the adult child’s own health and by the inclusion
of the fixed effect. Some argue that a parent’s health may directly affect work if
it provides new information about the child’s ability to work later or if the mental
health effects of watching a parent decline have a direct negative effect on health
(Amirkhanyan and Wolf 2006), which may also affect work; however, we suspect
these are relatively weak pathways (Coe and Van Houtven 2009). Having a parent
or in-law who is widowed means their spouse is not available to assume the care-
giving role, thereby increasing the demand for care provided by an adult child or
child-in-law. The recent passing of a parent or in-law potentially explains much of
the termination of care provision. The passing of a parent or in-law should only
affect work behavior of an adult child via the termination of care provision for that
parent or in-law or the provision of care for the widowed parent or in-law. Coe and
Van Houtven (2009) find the death of a parent does not have a direct effect on one’s
health or depressive symptoms, which alleviates concerns that the death of a parent
or in-law could influence work behavior via the bereavement effect. We discuss the
empirical strength of the instruments in Section 1.4.4.
1.4 Data and Sample Selection
We use data from nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) (1992-
2008). The HRS is a panel survey which provides longitudinal information on labor
supply, family structure, intergenerational transfers, health, income and assets. The
baseline interviews were completed for 12,654 individuals in 7,702 households in
1992. At that time, respondents were approximately 51 to 61 years old or were
married to individuals in that age range; thus, their parents were prime candidates
10
to be care recipients. Follow-up interviews took place biennially.
1.4.1 Sample Selection Criteria
We examine men and women separately, given their different attachment to
the labor force. Sample members include adult children between ages 45 and 70
who have at least one parent or parent in-law alive in the current survey wave or
two previous waves, and who are observed in at least two waves. For our baseline
specifications we eliminate observations from the 1992 wave because the survey did
not ask about all types of care assistance in that wave. Table 1.1 shows details
of the sample inclusion criteria for our baseline labor force participation and wage
estimations where we define a caregiver as someone who provides either personal or
chore assistance. The sample size changes slightly in each specification, depending
on which measure of informal care we use and the labor market outcome of interest
(the exact number of observations in each specification appears at the bottom of
Tables 1.4-1.9).
1.4.2 Dependent Variables
We examine four separate self-reported labor market outcomes, taken from the
RAND HRS data files. For labor force participation, our first work measure, we
categorize anyone who reports that they are working for pay (either for someone
else or self-employed) as working, and those out of work, looking for work, or retired
as not working. For the second work measure, self-reported retirement status, we
categorize anyone who states they are completely or partially retired as retired, with
the remainder as not retired.10 We also examine the usual number of hours worked
per week among workers to address the intensive margin of the work decision. Lastly,
we examine logged hourly wages among workers.11
10Housewives are categorized as not retired. In our robustness checks, we re-estimate the labor
force participation and retirement specifications only on those who have worked at some point since
age 45 and the results are qualitatively similar.
11If the respondent reports wages at a frequency other than hourly, the hourly wage rate is
calculated using the usual hours worked per week, usual weeks worked per year, and pay rate, and
adjusting for the periodicity of pay reported.
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1.4.3 Explanatory Variables
Informal care is self-reported by HRS respondents. Specifically, the HRS asks
whether individuals spent time helping each parent and in-law with “basic personal
activities such as dressing, eating, and bathing” or, in another question, “with other
things, such as household chores, errands, transportation, etc.” Our baseline speci-
fication uses a combined discrete measure of any caregiving (personal care or chore
care), but we explore differential effects for those providing personal care and those
providing chore assistance.12 Further, we analyze the impact of intensive caregiving,
defined as providing 1,000 or more hours of care (any type) during the previous two
years.13
The labor force participation, retirement, and hours of work models include the
same set of control variables. These models include individual fixed effects, which
capture time-invariant observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Thus,
many of the standard demographic variables shown to be important in other labor
supply models are captured in the fixed effect, such as the respondent’s race and
education. However, time-varying characteristics remain: marital status, age and
age squared, an indicator for achieving the Social Security Early Entitlement Age
(EEA) (62) but younger than the Full Retirement Age (FRA), an indicator for being
at or over the FRA (65-66 depending on birth year), and two discrete variables for
self-reported health (poor/fair and good indicators with excellent/very good as the
omitted category). Household characteristics include household size, whether there
is a child under age 18 in the home, and household asset quartiles (lowest quartile
omitted). Wave dummies control for time trends.
The logged hourly wage equation is an augmented Mincer wage equation. Con-
trols include years of work experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared,
12The caregiving question regarding chores and errands was not asked in 1992. Thus, we omit
the 1992 wave from our specifications that use the combined measure of caregiving. However, we
include observations from the 1992 wave in the specifications that use the personal care measure.
13For the 1994 survey wave only, we modify our intensive caregiving definition to include those
who report providing 500 or more hours of care since the question in that wave asks about the
amount of care provided in the last 12 months (rather than the last two years as in all subsequent
waves).
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an indicator for whether a person is a salaried worker (versus an hourly wage worker),
discrete variables for self-reported health and marital status, and an individual fixed
effect.14,15
1.4.4 Instrumental Variables
The identifying instruments we use measure parental health, broadly defined.
We experimented with the limited parental health information available in the HRS:
needing assistance with activities of daily living, having a memory problem, and not
being able to be left alone. Through extensive testing, we found “ill-health” of a
parent, defined as having any of these three conditions, to be a better instrument
than the three separate variables for parental health. We also use information about
potential alternative sources of informal care provision, mainly through whether
the parent or in-law was recently widowed. Our final sets of instruments include:
separate indicators for the mother (in-law) being ill; separate indicators for the
mother, father, mother-in-law, and/or father-in-law not being alive at any time
in the last two years; and, separate indicators for the mother (in-law) becoming
widowed since the last survey wave.16 We estimate our specifications using various
combinations of these instruments as described in the Appendix.
Our criteria for empirically strong instruments is that the joint F -statistic for the
excluded instruments in the first stage equation is above the conventionally-accepted
floor of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997) and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the
over-identification test of the excluded instruments.17 We also test whether we can
14Inclusion of fixed effects is why education and other time-invariant characteristics do not appear
in the wage equation.
15In our robustness checks, we omit experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, and
the salaried indicator since they may be endogenous, and replace them with age and age squared
instead, and our results are qualitatively similar.
16We do not include indicators for the father (in-law) being ill or becoming recently widowed
since these instruments perform poorly and do not predict informal care provision well, which is
consistent with studies that find fathers are less likely to receive care than mothers (Byrne et al.
2009, Hiedemann and Stern 1999). Women’s greater longevity also explains the weak performance
of the instruments since wives are more likely to provide care for their husbands, and adult children
are then likely to be called upon to care for their widowed mothers (Szinovacz and Davey 2008).
17The Sargan-Hansen test is employed to test the over-identifying restrictions. The joint null
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term,
and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection
casts doubt on the validity of the instruments.
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treat the suspect endogenous regressor as exogenous.18 A summary of the results
from these tests is provided in Table 1.2. An ‘X’ indicates that the instruments are
strong as defined above and that we cannot reject exogeneity of informal care, after
including individual fixed effects in our specifications. Note, for women we cannot
reject exogeneity of any, personal, chore, or intensive caregiving with respect to three
of the four work-related outcomes. However, we do find evidence of endogeneity of
care provision with respect to women’s work hours conditional on working. For
men, we cannot reject exogeneity of any, personal, chore, or intensive caregiving
with respect to all of the work-related outcomes, but we do face a weak instrument
problem when instrumenting for men’s intensive caregiving. Thus, we present the
results for men and women treating all measures of care provision as exogenous,
except for women’s hours of work, where we additionally present the instrumental
variables results.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Descriptive Results
Table 1.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample, by gender, and by
whether or not these individuals become caregivers during the observation period.
Because we use an unbalanced panel with repeated observations, we report the de-
scriptive statistics for the first time we observe the individual. Individuals who
become caregivers are actually more likely to be working at the baseline than their
non-caregiving counterparts (64 percent vs. 57 percent for women; 73 percent vs.
67 percent for men). However, among those working, their hours of work and wages
are similar.19
The difference in labor force participation rates is likely driven by a combination
of the demographic characteristics because the individuals who become caregivers
18We perform this test by analyzing the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for
the equation treating informal care as endogenous, and one for the equation treating informal care
as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis that informal care can actually be treated as exogenous,
the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared.
19All dollar amounts are reported in constant 2008 dollars.
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are younger, more educated, have a longer attachment to the labor force, and are
in better health, on average, in the baseline year. The differences in these observ-
able characteristics could cause worry about the estimates because one would want
comparable controls. First, we control for these observable differences. Second, if
there is something unobservable and time-invariant about the individuals who do
not become caregivers (i.e., a permanent disability) that makes them less likely to
provide informal care and less likely to work, then the individual fixed effects model
would address this issue. However, since the fixed effects model is identified off
within-person changes, if the non-caregivers have little or no variation in their care-
giving and labor market behavior, then we face an efficiency issue and are unlikely
to find significant effects. To help address this concern—that the non-caregiver
sample is unobservably less able to caregive or work, perhaps too sick or too old to
do either—we test the robustness of our results using different estimation samples
(Section 1.5.3).
1.5.2 Main Results
We discuss the results from the models of labor force participation, retirement,
and hours and logged wages conditional on working, examining differential effects
by the various caregiving definitions (any chore or personal care; personal care;
chore care; intensive care). Again, since we were not able to reject exogeneity of
our various measures of care provision with respect to almost all the labor market
outcomes of interest, we discuss the results from the models treating informal care
as exogenous. However, for women’s work hours, we also discuss the instrumental
variables results since we rejected exogeneity in those models.20 Unless noted in
parentheses in the text, the effects discussed below are significant at least at the 5
percent level.
20The instrumental variables results for the other work outcomes are discussed in the Appendix
and presented in Appendix Tables 1.1-1.4.
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Extensive Margin: Labor Force Participation
The linear probability model with individual fixed effects indicates that care-
giving of any type has no significant effect on labor force participation for men or
women (Table 1.4). Women who provide personal assistance with activities of daily
living are 1.4 percentage points (p < 0.10) less likely to be working, whereas male
personal caregivers are 2.4 percentage points less likely to be working. This rep-
resents a reduction in mean participation rates of 2.7 percent for women and 3.9
percent for men. We find no significant effect of providing chore or intensive care
on the labor force participation of men or women.
Not surprisingly, some of the strongest negative effects on labor force participa-
tion are the Social Security EEA and FRA. Women (men) between 62 and the FRA
are 6-7 (9-10) percentage points less likely to work than women (men) younger than
62. The effects are similar for being at or older than the FRA. Being married makes
women significantly less likely to work. Being in poor or fair health makes one less
likely to work than those in good health or better—women in poor or fair health are
about 8 percentage points less likely to work compared to women in excellent/very
good health, whereas men are 10 percentage points less likely to work. Many of
these findings are consistent across all the definitions of informal care.
Our estimates of the effects of caregiving on labor force partcipation tend to
be in the lower range of those found in the international literature. Heitmueller
(2007) estimates any care provision reduces labor force participation in the U.K.
by 6 percent, and providing 20 or more hours of care per week reduces labor force
participation by up to 26 percent, while Casado-Mar´ın et al. (2011) find providing
28 or more hours of care per week decreases the probability of working by 4.5 per-
centage points for women in Spain. Our finding that any type of care provision has
no significant effect on the probability of working is consistent with that of Wolf
and Soldo (1994) who find care provision has no effect for married women in the
U.S. However, our results highlight the importance of analyzing differential effects
by the type of care provided since we find personal care does significantly reduce
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women’s labor force participation.
Extensive Margin: Retirement
We next turn to the relationship between caregiving and the self-reported retire-
ment decision. Using this more subjective retirement status allows us to separate
the disabled and the unemployed from retired individuals (Maestas 2010). We also
suspect the subjective retirement definition to be more prevalent among older re-
spondents, and thus might respond differently to caregiving than the traditional
labor force participation outcome modeled above due to individual heterogeneity
correlated with age. Interestingly, our estimates do suggest a different relationship
between caregiving and retirement compared to labor force participation. The linear
probability model with individual fixed effects indicates that caregiving of any type
increases the probability of being retired by 1.7 percentage points for women and
1.6 percentage points for men (p < 0.10) (Table 1.5). This represents an increase
in mean self-reported retirement of 5.3 percent for women and 3.4 percent for men.
Unlike the labor force participation results, providing personal care has no signifi-
cant effect on the probability of retiring for men or women. Instead, the impact of
caregiving on retirement is driven by chore assistance, and not personal or intensive
caregiving. The retirement response to chore assistance may reflect the adult child’s
anticipation of the parent’s future caregiving needs and trajectory. Providing chore
care to a parent may be a sign of slowly-deteriorating health, which may require
informal care for many years, as opposed to a health shock in which personal care
is needed immediately. Further, because of the specific time-demands that often
accompany personal care provision, it may be less compatible with paid labor force
participation, whereas chore care would not involve such time constraints. Our esti-
mates suggest that chore caregiving changes one’s overall attitude towards continued
work as opposed to the labor force participation outcome itself.
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Intensive Margin: Hours
We then turn our attention to hours of work. We estimate the hours regressions
on those who are currently working for pay. The results when treating caregiving as
exogenous suggest that providing informal care has no significant impact on hours
worked among workers (Table 1.6). However, this was the one case where we found
evidence of remaining endogeneity in the female sample after controlling for fixed
effects. Table 1.7 presents the first and second-stage instrumental variables estimates
for women using IV Set 1 (mother and mother-in-law illness), as discussed in the
Appendix. When instrumenting for caregiving, we find that informal care has a
negative and significant effect on hours worked for working women, decreasing work
by 3.7 hours per week on average (p < 0.10), or 185 hours per year. This represents a
10.4 percent decrease in hours worked per week among working women. This effect is
driven by women providing chore care assistance, who decrease their hours per week
by almost 4.5 hours (p < 0.10). We also find intensive caregiving reduces women’s
work for those who are working by about 10 hours per week (p < 0.10), or 500 hours
per year. Combined with the results from Tables 1.4 and 1.5, these estimates suggest
that personal caregiving leads some women to leave the paid labor market, while
chore care leads some women who work to decrease their hours, perhaps combined
with partial retirement.
We have various sets of instrumental variables we could use to estimate the
impact of caregiving on work hours for those who work. If there is heterogeneity in
the response of work hours to care provision, the estimated coefficient we find should
be interpreted as the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). It is interesting to
see how our estimates of the LATE of caregiving on work hours change with the
instruments used. In Table 1.8, we present the results using four combinations of the
instruments described in Section 1.4.4: (1) Mother or mother-in-law ill; (2) Mother
or mother-in-law ill and indicators for recent death of each of the four parents/in-
laws; (3) Mother or mother-in-law ill and mother or mother-in-law recently widowed;
and (4) All of these instruments. We presented the results using IV Set 1 in Table
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1.7, where we find that working women who are induced to caregive due to having
an ill mother or mother-in-law decrease their work effort by 3.7 hours per week.
Adding indicators for recent death of the four parents/in-laws (IV Set 2) decreases
the magnitude of the estimated hours effect. This suggests that work hours are less
sensitive to caregiving changes for the group of working women who terminate care
provision after the passing of a parent (or who could also be induced to provide
care to a parent after the passing of another parent) than caregivers induced due
solely to an ill mother or mother-in-law. When we consider ill health of a mother or
mother-in-law and recent widowhood of a mother or mother-in-law (IV Set 3), we
find a larger hours effect. This makes sense intuitively. Recent widowhood is likely
correlated with a loss of an informal spousal care provider, so those working women
induced to provide informal care under those circumstances may be spending more
time, effort, or energy than those who provide care when their parent or in-law
has a spouse to provide informal care as well. Finally, when we include all of our
instruments, we estimate the hours effect of caregiving to be roughly the average
of the effects found using the previous three sets of instruments. Using the full set
we estimate slighly smaller hours effects than in our baseline specification. Working
women providing any type of care decrease their work effort by 2.6 hours per week;
personal care provision leads to a 2.9 hour per week decrease; chore care provision
leads to a 3.3 hour per week decrease, and intensive caregiving leads to a 9.0 hour
per week decrease.
Our estimates of the effect of caregiving on worker’s hours fall interestingly
within those of the prior literature. Several U.S. and European studies find care
provision has no significant effect on work hours (Bolin et al. 2008, Casado-Mar´ın
et al. 2011, Wolf and Soldo 1994), which we also find when treating informal care
as exogenous. However, like Ettner (1996), we find there is an endogeneity bias
on the effect of caregiving on work hours towards zero for women, and the effect
of care provision is significantly larger and negative when this endogeneity bias is
accounted for. Ettner (1996) estimates that non-coresidential caregiving leads to a
11-13 hour decrease in women’s work per week, and Johnson and LoSasso (2000)
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find care provision reduces both men and women’s work by about 460 hours per
year (or 9.2 hours per week assuming 50 weeks of work per year). We find any type
of care provision reduces women’s work hours by only 3.7 hours per week, but the
effect of intensive caregiving on women’s work hours is comparable to the effects
in Ettner (1996) and Johnson and LoSasso (2000). These results underscore the
importance of analyzing the effects of caregiving by the intensity of care provided.
Intensive Margin: Wages
Finally we turn our attention to estimating the effect of caregiving on wages
among workers. Providing any informal care has a negative effect on female workers’
wages. Caregiving of any type leads to a 2.3 percent reduction in a woman’s hourly
wage, on average, compared to not caregiving (p < 0.10) (Table 1.9). Using a Duan
smearing factor to account for retransformation bias (Duan 1983), female caregivers
are predicted to have a wage of $15.91 compared to $16.28 for non-caregivers, or a
loss of $0.37 per hour in absolute terms. Extrapolating to a year’s worth of work
given mean hours worked per week among female workers observed in our sample
was 35 and, assuming 50 weeks of paid work a year, the wage penalty accumulates
to $647 in lost earnings for one year on average. Providing personal care does not
have a significant effect on women’s wages, but providing chore assistance decreases
a woman’s hourly wage by 2.6 percent (p < 0.10), a loss of $0.42 per hour on av-
erage ($15.86 compared to $16.28). Chore care provision also led to fewer work
hours among female workers, so this wage effect is compounded by the hours effect
reported in Table 1.7. We find with a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation that
female chore care providers who work forgo up to $5,400 per year on average from
the combined effect of chore care provision on hours and wages.21
Since identification of the wage effect is coming off within-person variation, the
wage penalty we find may suggest that female caregivers are moving to lower paying
21Working chore care providers decrease their work by 4.5 hours per week. On average, working
women in our sample work 35 hours per week at $21 per hour, for 50 weeks per year. Thus,
the combined effect of chore care provision on earnings through hours and wages is approximately
$5,400 per year.
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jobs (perhaps with more flexible work arrangements) or experiencing a decrease in
productivity due to caregiving that is reflected in the wage. According to a 2009
survey, 12 percent of caregivers reported ever reducing work hours or taking a less
demanding job as a result of care provision, while 66 percent reported often arriving
late to work or leaving early due to caregiving needs (National Alliance for Care-
giving and AARP 2009). Such work accommodations could result in a lower wage
for caregivers.
We find evidence of a wage premium among male workers who are providing
intensive care. Men providing intensive care earn almost 16 percent more than their
non-caregiving counterparts, on average, (p < 0.10) ($30.53 compared to $26.03).
To the extent that selection into work is driven by time-varying unobservables, this
estimated wage effect includes the impact of selection into work, which may account
for the surprising sign. However, given the insignificant and small effect of intensive
caregiving on male labor force participation, this wage premium does not seem likely
to be driven by selection into work, but instead is a true wage effect. Given that over
half of the intensively caregiving men are married to intensively caregiving women,
it is possible that these men are moving to higher wage jobs to insure their wife’s
potential decrease in labor income. These men may also be moving to higher wage
jobs in order to contribute to future formal care expenses, especially if the parent’s
health is deteriorating severely.
Our estimates of the effect of caregiving on wages for those who work tend to fall
in the range found in the international literature. While Bolin et al. (2008) find care
provision does not significantly affect the wages of men or women in Europe, much of
the U.K. literature finds evidence of wage penalties. Carmichael and Charles (2003)
find caregiving more than 10 hours per week reduces wages by 9 percent for women
and 18 percent for men, while Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) find caregivers in the
U.K. earn 3 percent less than non-caregivers with similar characteristics. Impor-
tantly, we find the wage penalty for women is concentrated among those providing
chore assistance, and while caregiving for the most part does not affect the wages of
working men, there is evidence of a wage premium for intensively caregiving men.
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1.5.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
Thus far we have estimated our specifications on the sample of men and women
between ages 45 and 70 who have a parent or in-law alive in the current survey wave
or the last two waves. We assess how sensitive the results are to these sample re-
strictions. First, we re-estimate our specifications on those who have had a parent or
in-law alive at any point during the survey. This implies we observe each individual
for more waves, but have potentially less variation in caregiving behavior. To ad-
dress the opposite concern, that we may be including too many people with parents
who do not need any care, we re-estimate on the subsample of individuals who have
parents or in-laws who are ever ill during the sample frame, where our measure of
being ill includes having ADL needs, having a memory problem, or not being able
to be left alone. The results with any of these samples are qualitatively similar to
our baseline results for all our labor market outcomes of interest. The largest quan-
titative difference is found when we restrict the sample to those who have worked
since age 45. We present both the baseline results and the results from restricting
the sample to those who have worked since age 45 in Table 1.10. We find the effects
are largely the same, but the impact of caregiving on women’s retirement is slightly
stronger among the sample that has worked since age 45. These results suggest
that the retirement effect is larger among recent workers, with any caregiving and
chore caregiving increasing the probability of retirement by 2.2 percentage points
(compared to 1.7 and 1.8 percentage points respectively in the baseline model).
We also analyze whether caregiving has heterogeneous impacts by marital status
in the labor force participation and retirement specifications, and find that none of
the interaction terms are significant. We do, however, find heterogeneous impacts
by age, particularly for women at the FRA or older in the labor force participation
equations, and for men above the EEA in the retirement specifications. For exam-
ple, personal caregiving decreases the probability of work for women at the FRA
or older by an additional 5.3 percentage points compared to female personal care-
givers younger than 62, while caregiving of any type and chore caregiving decreases
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the probability of labor force participation for women at the FRA or older by an
additional 3.9 percentage points compared to those younger than 62. Caregiving of
any type increases the probability of retirement for men between the EEA (62) and
the FRA by an additional 3.5 percentage points and for men at the FRA or older
by 3.9 percentage points compared to male caregivers younger than 62. Personal
care provision increases the probability of retirement for men between the EEA and
FRA by an additional 5.4 percentage points compared to those younger than 62.
We also examine the sensitivity of our estimates to different wage equation spec-
ifications. Our baseline specification is motivated theoretically by Mincer’s work.
However, since we are estimating labor force particpation equations and finding some
significant effects of caregiving on working, there may be concern that the tenure
and experience variables are endogenous in the wage equation. We estimate alterna-
tive specifications (see Table 1.11). In column 1, we present our baseline estimates
for comparison purposes. Specification 2 removes the tenure and experience-related
variables as well as the salaried indicator from the equations. The third specifica-
tion adds age and age squared to Specification 2, to capture the age-profile of wages
without relying on the tenure and experience information to do so. We find quan-
titatively similar estimates across the specifications. Our baseline specification, if
anything, give us lower estimates of the wage effect for women, while the effect for
men remains virtually identical.
Last, we compare the results of our fixed effects models to those from random
effects models.22 The random effects models tend to overstate the effects of care
provision compared to the fixed effects results, especially for female intensive care-
givers. For example, we find no significant effect of intensive caregiving on female
labor force participation or retirement probabilities in the fixed effects models, but
intensive caregiving reduces the probability of working by 3.0-3.5 percentage points,
22For the labor force participation and retirement models, we compare our fixed effects linear
probability model results to random effects linear probability model and random effects probit
results, and for the work hours for men and log wage models, we compare our fixed effects linear
regression results to random effects linear regression results. For the women’s work hours models,
we compare the results of fixed effects and random effects 2SLS using Instrument Set 1. We test
whether a fixed or random effects model is appropriate for each of our regressions, and in every case
we soundly reject consistency of the random effects estimator, suggesting fixed effects is appropriate.
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and increases the probability of being retired by 2.8-3.1 percentage points in the
random effects models (Table 1.12). In addition, we did not find evidence of sig-
nificant wage effects for female intensive caregivers in the fixed effects model, but
find intensive caregiving reduces a working intensive caregiver’s wage by 5.3 per-
cent in the random effects model. For men, the random effects models overstate
the effects of any caregiving and personal caregiving on labor force participation as
well as the effects of any, personal, and chore care provision on the probability of
being retired compared to the fixed effects results (Table 1.13). Importantly, the
overall qualitative pattern we find in our fixed effects results does not change in the
random effects results—personal care impacts labor force participation, while chore
care impacts retirement. These findings suggest that prior studies which account for
permanent unobserved heterogeneity via random effects may overstate or provide an
upper bound on the effects of caregiving on labor market outcomes by assuming the
permanent heterogeneity is uncorrelated with care provision and other explanatory
variables.
1.6 Conclusion
In general, we find that only personal care assistance reduces the labor force
participation of men and women. Our findings, of a 1.4 percentage point drop in
labor force participation for women and a 2.4 percentage point drop for men lie
in the lower end of the range found in the international literature. We also find
evidence of caregiving women making adjustments on the intensive work margin,
with heterogeneity in the response based on the type and intensity of care provided.
While the U.S. literature has generally found substantial decreases in work hours
for female caregivers, we find such large decreases are concentrated mostly among
intensive caregivers.
We find that caregiving increases the likelihood of retirement for men and women
by 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points, and that this increase seems to be driven by those
providing chore assistance. The different relationship between caregiving and retire-
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ment compared to labor force participation underscores the importance of consid-
ering heterogeneous effects by the type of care provided. It may be that personal
caregivers are leaving the labor force involuntarily because of an unexpected health
shock to a parent or in-law that makes it difficult to juggle the personal caregiving
with their paid job. These personal caregivers may expect to return to work, and
are not calling themselves retired per se, especially if they view their provision of
personal care as temporary (for example, for a year or two after a parent has had a
stroke). The retirement response to chore care may reflect the adult child anticipat-
ing the future long-term care needs of the parent, as providing chore care may be
a sign of slowly-deteriorating parental health. Thus, chore assistance may change
one’s expectations toward continued work and leads some to decrease their work
hours in combination with partial retirement.
We also find modest wage penalties among female caregivers, around $0.40 per
hour in wages, that is driven by chore assistance. This finding suggests female
caregivers may be moving to lower paying jobs, perhaps with more workplace flexi-
bility. If providing chore care is a sign of a parent’s declining health and a possible
lengthy caregiving episode, these caregiving women may anticipate future informal
care needs and move to less demanding jobs. The wage penalty may also be a result
of decreased productivity or reliability due to caregiving responsibilities. Surpris-
ingly, we find a wage premium among male intensive caregivers. The wage benefits
to these male caregivers are not insubstantial—a $4.50 per hour gain in predicted
wages. This finding is hard to interpret, but may be the result of men moving to
higher paying jobs, perhaps because their wife is also engaged in intensive caregiving
(as is the case for most men providing large amounts of care) and he is insuring her
foregone earnings. These men may also be moving to higher paying jobs in anticipa-
tion of future health care expenses that may arise if the parent’s health deteriorates
and formal care becomes necessary.
Our approach has allowed us to learn about three important features that should
be considered in future work: (1) We do not find evidence of endogeneity after in-
cluding fixed effects across many of the specifications explored in this paper. The
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instruments are strong; thus, we conclude that selection bias may not be a major
concern for extensive margins of labor force participation after controlling for perma-
nent unobserved heterogeneity with fixed effects. (2) It is important to distinguish
between the types and intensity of care being provided. For both male and female
caregivers, only personal care has a negative effect on labor force participation. On
the other hand, personal care does not seem to impact self-reported retirement for
men or women, but providing chore assistance does. Female chore caregivers also
experience wage penalties. (3) It is important to model separately the effects of
caregiving on men and women. Men experience a wage premium from intensive
caregiving whereas women experience a wage penalty in several cases. In addition,
working women who provide care reduce their work effort by 3-10 hours per week,
while caregiving has no effect on working men’s hours.
Most concerns raised about long-term care in the U.S. have focused on govern-
ment expenditures on formal care, and in particular nursing home costs and state
Medicaid budgets as well as home health care payments and the Medicare program.
Our results show that adult children who provide care informally to their parents
or in-laws face substantial opportunity costs. If policy-makers aim to enable more
people to combine both caregiving and work, more flexible work arrangements or
generous leave policies may be needed. In particular, if the wage penalty for fe-
male caregivers is due to women moving to less demanding or more flexible jobs,
then mandated flexible work schedules may ameliorate this effect. Given caregivers
are more likely to retire and female working caregivers are more likely to reduce
their work hours, work programs for individuals near retirement age that detail the
long-term financial penalties of retiring early or decreasing work effort, telecommut-
ing options, or employer- or publicly-financed offers of respite care to older workers
providing care to an elderly parent may be particularly well-targeted. Encouraging
caregivers to remain in the labor force could help minimize welfare losses to the
caregivers by maximizing their Social Security benefits in old age. Such efforts,
however, would need to be balanced against the potential costs to care recipients
and public insurance programs if adult children, by remaining in the labor force, are
26
unable to provide informal care.
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1.7 Chapter 1 Appendix
1.7.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation
We consider four sets of instruments:
1. An indicator for the mother being ill; an indicator for the mother-in-law being
ill.
2. An indicator for the mother being ill; an indicator for the mother-in-law being
ill; an indicator for mother died; an indicator for father died; an indicator for
mother-in-law died; an indicator for father-in-law died.
3. An indicator for the mother being ill; an indicator for the mother-in-law being
ill; an indicator for mother widowed; an indicator for mother-in-law widowed.
4. An indicator for the mother being ill; an indicator for the mother-in-law being
ill; an indicator for mother died; an indicator for father died; an indicator
for mother-in-law died; an indicator for father-in-law died; an indicator for
mother widowed; an indicator for mother-in-law widowed.
Table 1.2 summarizes the empirical strength of the various sets of instruments in
the different specifications. Generally, our instruments perform very well and are
empirically strong. Except for men’s intensive caregiving, the F -statistic of the ex-
cluded instruments in the first stage is above the conventionally accepted floor of
10 across our specifications, and we strongly reject the hypothesis that the excluded
instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first-stage regression. We also generally
find that our overidentifying restrictions are valid. With the exception of women’s
work hours, we cannot reject exogeneity of informal care regardless of how caregiv-
ing is defined. For this reason, our preferred specifications are those in which we
treat informal care as exogenous (except for women’s work hours).
Appendix Tables 1.1-1.4 compare the estimates from the models treating care-
giving as exogenous to those treating caregiving as endogenous with 2SLS using
Instrument Set 1 as described above. We find the effect of caregiving on men and
28
women’s labor force participation, self-reported retirement and log wages conditional
on working as well as men’s work hours conditional on working to be insignificant
when using 2SLS, which is not surprising given the inherent loss in precision in in-
strumental variables estimation. In fact, in some specifications, the standard errors
from the 2SLS models increase by a factor of 10 compared to those from the OLS
models. The sign of the coefficients does switch in some of the 2SLS specifications,
such as the effect of personal care on women’s labor force participation, the effect
of all the measures of care on men’s labor force participation, and the effect of all
the measures of care on men and women’s self-reported retirement. However, the
confidence intervals of the instrumental variables estimates overlap with the origi-
nal estimates (under the exogeneity assumption) in all but the women’s work hours
specifications. This finding holds across the four different instrument sets. Thus,
the only case where the 2SLS confidence intervals do not contain the OLS point
estimates is also the only case in which we can soundly reject exogeneity of informal
care (women’s work hours).
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1.8 Chapter 1 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Sample Selection Criteria
LFP Estimation Wage Estimation
Women Men Women Men
Person-wave observations 50,883 40,765 50,883 40,765
Between 45 and 70 years old 43,693 32,439 43,693 32,439
At least one parent or in-law alive 25,323 20,966 25,323 20,966in current or previous two waves
Eliminate 1992 wave (no chore question) 21,236 17,093 21,236 17,093
Working in current wave 11,096 10,409
Non-missing wage 9,681 8,860
Person-wave observations in estimation 21,057 17,006 9,547 8,716
Unique individuals in estimation 4,521 3,993 2,942 2,774
These sample sizes are for the labor force participation and wage models using any type of care
as the informal care measure. When we use the personal care measure we gain observations
since we can also estimate on the 1992 wave.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Adult Children
Women Men
Ever Never Ever Never
Caregivers Caregivers Caregivers Caregivers
Working for pay 0.644 0.574 *** 0.730 0.669 ***
Retired 0.201 0.202 0.317 0.346 *
Hours of work/weeka 36.99 36.84 43.75 43.88
Hourly wagea 19.21 16.84 29.66 29.03
Age
Average age 54.80 55.67 *** 57.69 58.78 ***
Percent age EEA-FRA 0.066 0.095 *** 0.114 0.162 ***
Percent FRA and older 0.011 0.018 * 0.063 0.103 ***
Married 0.761 0.762 0.858 0.837 *
Non-white 0.181 0.207 ** 0.143 0.195 ***
Education
Less than high school 0.196 0.308 *** 0.210 0.341 ***
High school 0.398 0.354 *** 0.325 0.298 *
Some college 0.218 0.197 * 0.221 0.154 ***
College graduate 0.188 0.141 *** 0.244 0.207 ***
Has a child under 18 0.128 0.143 0.149 0.158
Household size 2.584 2.662 ** 2.640 2.703
Self-reported health
Excellent or very good 0.546 0.481 *** 0.532 0.450 ***
Good 0.282 0.279 0.300 0.299
Fair or poor 0.172 0.240 *** 0.168 0.251 ***
Average years of work experience 24.03 21.19 *** 36.23 34.98 ***
Unique individuals 2,552 1,969 1,962 2,031
The descriptive statistics are reported for the first survey wave in which the individual is observed in the
fixed effects linear probability model of labor force participation using any type of care as the informal care
measure.
Significant difference in a two-sided t-test as compared to non-caregivers at *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10%
level.
aConditional on working.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Wage and
Employment Effects of Elder
Parent Care
How does caregiving for an elderly parent affect a woman’s current and future
labor force participation and wages? Working less to provide care clearly affects a
woman’s current income, but it is also clear that her future labor market opportu-
nities can be affected. Women who spend time away from work to provide care may
later struggle to find a job or return to their previous wage. In addition, caregiv-
ing often involves a significant time commitment. On average, caregivers provide
10 to 20 hours of care per week for four years (MetLife 2009a, National Alliance
for Caregiving and AARP 2009). Thus, the decision to provide care may mean a
substantial loss of current and future earning capacity. These considerations make
clear the potential long-term labor market effects of caregiving and underscore the
inherent forward-looking nature of caregiving and work decisions.
Understanding the short and long-term effects of caregiving on work and wages
is an important policy issue given the large and growing population of disabled
elderly and the prevalence of informal care provided by adult daughters, most of
whom have a history of working. Currently in the United States there are 9 million
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men and women over the age of 65 who need help with basic personal activities,
household chores or errands. By 2020, 12 million older Americans are projected to
need long-term care.1 About 70 percent of the elderly rely solely on informal care
from family or friends, and about two-thirds of elder parent caregivers are women,
a group which has experienced increasing labor force participation rates. In light
of these trends and the fact that a typical caregiver is in her fifties or early sixties,
still in her prime working years, providing care may involve a considerable loss of
current and future human capital and job opportunities.
Despite the intertemporal nature of caregiving and work, the existing literature
has overlooked the dynamics of these decisions. Most models are static and focus
only on current foregone wages, which could seriously underestimate the costs of
caregiving. In contrast to most earlier studies, I model caregiving and work deci-
sions in an explicitly intertemporal framework in which women make these decisions
considering how they will affect future outcomes. I build and estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model of caregiving and work that incorporates dynamic elements
such as health changes of elderly parents, human capital accumulation and labor
market frictions. These features allow for long-term labor market effects of informal
care that may arise due to foregone or lower wages and/or decreased job oppor-
tunities during and after a caregiving spell. By incorporating these elements in a
dynamic framework, I can identify various channels through which caregiving affects
a woman’s labor market outcomes over the short and long-term.
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using eight waves of data from
the Health and Retirement Study by efficient method of moments. The results high-
light various static and dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers. Women
who begin care provision are likely to continue to do so, especially if their parent
is in poor health. Thus, when a woman makes caregiving and work decisions, she
not only considers the tradeoff between caregiving and work today, but also the
potential long-term tradeoffs generated by the persistence in caregiving. In addi-
1Medicare.gov: http://www.medicare.gov/longtermcare/static/home.asp and US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services’ National Clearinghouse for Long-Term Care:
http://www.longtermcare.gov/LTC
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tion, women are more likely to provide large amounts of care when their parents
are in poor health, and these intensive care providers are less likely to be working,
especially full-time.
The estimates also underscore the importance of labor market frictions. Women
who do not work face low probabilities of receiving job offers in the future. For
example, the probability a non-working woman younger than 62 will receive a part-
time (full-time) offer next period is 7-9 (9-12) percent. Thus, those who leave work
to provide care may find it difficult to return. The estimates also reveal that women
cannot move frictionlessly between full and part-time work. As a result, a woman
may not always have the option to decrease her work hours while providing care. If
she does work part-time while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to move
to full-time work in the future. The wage estimates show that there are returns
to experience, there is a wage penalty for not working in the prior period and that
part-time jobs are associated with lower wages. Thus, women who leave work to
provide care forgo experience and the associated wage returns, and face a lower
expected wage if they return to work. In addition, caregivers are more likely to
work part-time than non-caregivers, and earn a lower wage than had they worked
full-time.
I use the parameter estimates and model to calculate the value (equivalently,
the cost) of elder parent care, which reflects both the static and dynamic value of
caregiving. The median value of initiating care provision is $66,370 over a two-year
period, about half the cost of two years of nursing home care. This estimate is
two to three times larger than the values found in the previous literature, which
are calculated using the replacement wage approach or current foregone wages due
to caregiving. Thus, calculations that ignore forward-looking behavior and the in-
tertemporal nature of caregiving and work decisions underestimate the value of elder
parent care.
The estimated structural parameters are then used to analyze how various gov-
ernment sponsored programs for elder parent care affect a woman’s caregiving and
labor market decisions. I analyze three counterfactual policy experiments: (1) A
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two-year unpaid work leave to provide intensive care for a parent; (2) A two-year
paid work leave to provide intensive care where the caregiver receives a payment
that is tied to the health of the parent; (3) A caregiver allowance where those who
provide intensive care receive a payment that is tied to the health of their parent, is
not linked to their employment status and can be received indefinitely. The first pol-
icy experiment is a lengthier version of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
of 1993 which allows workers to take up to a 12-week unpaid leave to care for an
ill family member and guarantees the worker will return to his/her job at the same
wage. The second policy experiment is of particular interest as paid leaves have re-
cently received much attention both at the national and state-level.2 The caregiver
allowance experiment may inform about the labor market effects of policies similar
to that of the recently suspended CLASS Act.
The results of the policy experiments show that both the unpaid and paid leaves
generate modest increases in intensive care provision, and encourage more work,
especially full-time, among women who ever provide intensive care to a parent. On
the other hand, the caregiver allowance generates substantial increases in intensive
care provision, but leads to an increase in non-work among women who ever provide
intensive care. A comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows
that about half the value of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave,
and the caregiver allowance and the unpaid leave generate comparable welfare gains.
The gains generated by the leaves emphasize the value of guaranteeing a caregiver
can return to work, and underscore the importance of taking an intertemporal ap-
proach to modeling caregiving and work.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the literature. The struc-
tural model is presented in Section 2.2. Identification is discussed in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 describes the data, discusses empirical implementation and provides de-
scriptive statistics. Estimation is discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the
2For example, H.R. 1723 The Family Leave Insurance Act of 2009 was introduced in the 111th
Congress to provide for a paid family and medical leave insurance program. Also, the federal
budget for fiscal year 2011 establishes a $50 million State Paid Leave Fund within the Department
of Labor to provide competitive grants to help states launch paid family leave programs similar to
those already established in California and New Jersey.
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main results, model fit and the value of elder parent care calculation. Section 2.7
discusses the counterfactual policy experiments and results, and Section 2.8 con-
cludes.
2.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first examines the
relationship between elder parent care and labor market outcomes such as labor force
participation, work hours and wages. Most US and European studies find there is
a negative correlation between female labor force participation and caregiving (Et-
tner 1995, Pavalko and Artis 1997, Heitmueller 2007, Bolin et al. 2008, Crespo and
Mira 2010, Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira 2010).3 However, the magnitude of this
negative correlation varies across studies, ranging from an almost negligible effect
to a 30 percentage point decrease in the probability of working. In addition, this
negative correlation is stronger among intensive caregivers, or those with a greater
commitment of caregiving time (Ettner 1995, Carmichael and Charles 1998, Heit-
mueller 2007, Casado-Mar´ın et al. 2011).
There is less consensus concerning whether caregivers who remain in the la-
bor force reduce their work hours. Wolf and Soldo (1994), Bolin et al. (2008) and
Casado-Mar´ın et al. (2011) find little evidence of caregiving reducing work hours,
while Ettner (1996), Johnson and LoSasso (2000) and Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira
(2010) find female caregivers in the US do reduce their work hours. In terms of
wage effects, Carmichael and Charles (2003) find caregiving for more than 10 hours
per week reduces current wages by 9 percent for women in the UK, and Heitmueller
and Inglis (2007) find caregivers in the UK earn 3 percent less than non-caregivers
with similar characteristics. Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira (2010) find caregiving
leads to a 2.3 to 2.6 percent reduction in a woman’s hourly wage in the US. While
this literature examines several tradeoffs between caregiving and female labor sup-
ply, the tradeoffs are analyzed in isolation. In addition, these studies only evaluate
3Wolf and Soldo (1994) is a notable exception which finds no evidence of informal care reducing
the propensity of married women to be employed.
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the effect of caregiving today on a woman’s current labor market outcomes.4 This
is the first paper to examine the effects of caregiving on current and future labor
force participation, at the intensive and extensive margins, as well as wages in one
comprehensive framework.
This paper also contributes to the literature that formulates theoretical models
of caregiving and work. Almost all of the models are static time allocation models
where the adult child makes caregiving and work decisions at a single point in time
and the only cost of caregiving is current foregone wages (for example, Bo¨rsch-Supan
et al. 1992, Johnson and LoSasso 2000, Crespo and Mira 2010, Knoef and Kooreman
2011). There is no forward-looking behavior, no parental health dynamics and no
long-term costs of caregiving. Fevang et al. (2009) is the only study which provides
a theoretical model of caregiving and work with multiple periods. In that model,
however, perfect foresight is assumed—with certainty a parent is healthy in the first
period, sick and in need of care in the second period, and passes away in the third
period. The adult child can freely adjust her work hours over these three periods
and the wage is assumed to be constant over all periods.
I expand upon the literature by modeling caregiving and work decisions in an
intertemporal framework which includes a forward-looking adult daughter, parental
health changes and uncertainty, human capital accumulation and labor market fric-
tions. The model allows informal care to have long-term labor market effects through
several channels, such as foregone or lower wages over time and decreased job offers.
With the recent exception of Knoef and Kooreman (2011), the structural param-
eters of the theoretical models are not estimated in the above-mentioned studies.5
By estimating the structural parameters of the model, I can simulate counterfac-
tual policy experiments such as the work leave and caregiver allowance programs
4Heitmueller et al. (2010) and Moscarola (2010) allow last year’s caregiving decision to affect
current labor force participation but do not allow for direct contemporaneous effects of caregiving on
employment. Spiess and Schneider (2003) find recently terminating care provision is insignificantly
related to changes in work hours in Europe.
5Knoef and Kooreman (2011) estimate the structural parameters of their static model using
only children, and then use those estimates to assess the nature of interactions between siblings.
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (1992) jointly model employment and “time spent with parents,” which is
a much broader concept than time spent providing care. They estimate equations based on the
underlying structural model.
51
described above. No studies have attempted to analyze the impact of government
sponsored elder parent care programs on the caregiving and labor supply decisions
of adult children in the US or the welfare gains generated by such policies.
2.2 Model
To answer the questions posed above, I propose a one-child one-parent structural
dynamic discrete choice model in which an adult daughter makes joint decisions
about caregiving and work.6 The optimization problem, consistent with the data
available for estimation, begins at a point in the middle of the daughter’s lifecycle.7
At any period t, the daughter has up to two choices to make. She makes an employ-
ment decision E = {0, PT, FT} for non-employment, part-time work and full-time
work, respectively, and a caregiving decision (given a parent is alive) CG = {0, 1, 2}
for no caregiving, light caregiving and intensive caregiving, respectively.
2.2.1 Preferences
The woman is forward-looking and at any time t, her objective is to maximize her
expected lifetime utility, Ut, given the choice set she faces. A woman’s period utility,
ut, is determined by her consumption, Ct, leisure time, Lt, and caregiving decision,
CGt. The daughter receives direct utility from light and intensive caregiving which
varies with the health state of her parent, Hpt .8 This captures the idea that when a
parent is very sick, a child may derive relatively more utility from caregiving than
when the parent is healthy. In addition, there is a utility cost to initiating care
which varies with the health of the parent. This captures the idea that beginning
care provision may involve substantial adjustments (in the daughter’s schedule, for
6I abstract from the other parent since less than 7 percent of female caregivers care for both
parents simultaneously. If both parents are alive, spousal caregiving is the most prevalent form of
informal care (Spillman and Pezzin 2000). I abstract from other adult children since among families
with at least one informal care provider and at least two adult children, only 14 percent include
multiple caregiving adult children (Byrne et al. 2009). Modeling a dynamic sibling bargaining game
is currently beyond the scope of this paper but is a promising avenue for future research.
7Initial conditions are those that prevail at that lifecycle point, and are addressed in Section
2.4.3.
8The parental health states and the health transition process are discussed in detail in Section
2.2.5.
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example) and may be more difficult when the parent is already in poor health.
Utility from caregiving also varies with whether the woman has a sister, sist, since
she may derive relatively less utility from caregiving when there are other adult
daughters who could potentially provide care.9,10 I allow for permanent unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences through differences in the utility from leisure.11 The
period utility function is assumed to be linear in its arguments with some interaction
terms and is given by
ut = u (ln(Ct), ln(Lt), CGt;Hpt , sist, CGt−1, $, νt,E,CG) (2.1)
where $ denotes the woman’s unobserved type and νt,E,CG denotes time-varying
unobserved utility from each choice in the model. The unobserved utility argu-
ments, νt,E,CG, are assumed to be additively separable, serially uncorrelated and
normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix Σν to be estimated.12
The assumed utility function specification is provided in the Appendix.
2.2.2 Time and Budget Constraints
The daughter’s leisure, Lt, is constrained to equal the time that remains in a
period given her work and caregiving choices. Caregiving is a use of time that is
valued differently than leisure since a woman gets direct utility from caregiving, but
the time constraint makes it clear that the direct opportunity cost of caregiving is
9I abstract from allowing utility from caregiving to vary with whether the woman has a brother
since Engers and Stern (2002), Checkovich and Stern (2002), Byrne et al. (2009) and several others
find that all else equal, daughters are significantly more likely than sons to provide care.
10I assume the utility from informal care provision does not vary with the parent’s financial
needs. McGarry (1998) finds no significant difference between more and less wealthy parents in the
conditional probability of receiving informal care from children. Brown (2007) finds no evidence
that children provide care in response to their parents’ financial need, but rather to their parents’
care needs in a dynamic structural model of parents’ retirement asset choices and family care
arrangements.
11I allow for two types, ! ∈ {1, 2}, who differ in permanent features unobserved to the econo-
metrician. In addition to having different leisure preferences, the types have different wage offer
intercepts as discussed in Section 2.2.4.
12More precisely, two covariance matrices are estimated. A 9×9 covariance matrix governs the
unobserved utility from each joint caregiving and work choice for those with a parent alive. A 3×3
covariance matrix governs the unobserved utility from each work choice for women without a parent
alive (since they no longer make a caregiving choice).
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foregone leisure time. The time constraint is given by
Lt = T − hEt − hCGt (2.2)
where T is the total time available per decision period, hEt denotes the hours asso-
ciated with the woman’s employment choice and hCGt denotes the hours associated
with her caregiving choice.
The daughter’s consumption, Ct, is constrained by the sum of her hourly wage,
wt, times hours worked, hEt , and non-labor income, yt.13 Non-labor income varies
with the woman’s education, age and marital status, and is included because the
woman may receive income from other sources such as her spouse or retirement ben-
efits.14 Thus, non-labor income captures the influences of spousal labor supply. The
Appendix describes how non-labor income is formulated. The budget constraint is
given by
Ct = wthEt + yt (2.3)
13I abstract from including savings behavior directly in the model. This may be a concern
if those with more savings substitute away from informal care provision and purchase care for
their parents. However, in the data, there is no descriptive evidence of a lower probability of
informal care provision for those with more liquid wealth or savings. In addition, Byrne et al.
(2009) find among families where elderly parents receive formal health care, only 9 percent of
these parents receive financial contributions for this care from their children. There may also be a
concern that those with more wealth can afford to caregive by consuming their savings; however,
there is no evidence that light nor intensive caregivers experience significantly different changes in
assets or savings than non-caregivers. This descriptive evidence cannot be interpreted causally, and
savings would need to be included directly in the structural model to test its behavioral impact.
Savings is currently incorporated in the model in that the woman’s initial liquid assets enter the
unobserved type probabilities, which is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.3. This allows for
persistent differences in behavior based on wealth that operate through the permanent unobserved
heterogeneity, but not intertemporal adjustments in consumption and savings behavior.
14I abstract from inheritances and inter-vivos transfers between the parent and daughter; thus,
caregiving decisions are not motivated by such financial considerations in the model. Most recent
studies do not support the bequest motive. For example, Brown (2007) finds no evidence that
children’s caregiving behavior is influenced by parents’ planned bequests; Norton and Van Houtven
(2006) find informal care has no effect on the equality of intended bequests; and, Checkovich and
Stern (2002) conclude that children do not compete for bequests through their provision of informal
care. The evidence on inter-vivos transfers is mixed. McGarry and Schoeni (1997) and Brown (2006)
find parents do not transfer significantly more to their caregiving children than their non-caregiving
children on average. Norton and Van Houtven (2006), however, find a child who provides care is 11
to 16 percentage points more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer than a sibling who does not
provide care. If such financial considerations motivate caregiving decisions for some women, this
will be reflected in the utility from caregiving parameters.
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2.2.3 Job Dynamics
If a woman worked part-time in period t − 1, she is assumed to receive a part-
time offer with certainty in period t, and if she worked full-time in period t− 1, she
is assumed to receive a full-time offer with certainty in period t.15 If the woman was
not working part-time in period t − 1, either because she was not working or was
working full-time, she receives a part-time offer in period t with probability λPT (Zt),
where Zt is a vector of the woman’s characteristics. If she was not working full-time
in period t − 1, either because she was not working or was working part-time, she
receives a full-time offer in period t with probability λFT (Zt).16 The offer arrival
rates are assumed to come from a logistic distribution and are given by
λE(Zt) =
exp[λEZt]
1 + exp[λEZt]
E ∈ {PT, FT} (2.4)
where
λEZt = λE0 + λ
E
1 I(Et−1 = 0) + λ
E
2 I(aget ≥ 62) + λE3 I(educt = 2) + λE4 I(educt = 3)
The vector Zt includes whether the woman worked last period or not, I(Et−1 = 0),
whether she has reached the age of 62, I(aget ≥ 62), and her education.17 The job
offer probabilities depend on whether the woman has reached age 62 since Social
Security retirement benefits can be claimed at this age and could consequently affect
search and job offer probabilities. I assume job offer arrival rates are constant over
calendar time; thus, the offer probabilities do not account for business cycle effects.
15Since transitions from full-time to part-time work, and vice versa, are infrequent in the data,
job holding is assumed. About 16.7 percent of those working part-time in period t transition to
full-time work the next period, and 10.6 percent of those working full-time in period t transition to
part-time work the following period.
16The offer arrival rates reflect both search by the woman and contact made by the firm. The
model assumes identical women (in terms of observables) face the same arrival rates. If there are
differences in search intensity that are not captured in Zt, this can be introduced in the model by
including a search decision with a cost attached.
17Education is discretized into three categories: (1) Less than a high school degree; (2) High
school degree/GED; and (3) At least some college.
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2.2.4 Wages
If a woman receives a job offer, she also receives an hourly wage offer given by
lnwt =β0," + β1aget + β2age2t + β3expert + β4exper
2
t + β5I(educt = 2)
+ β6I(educt = 3) + β7I(Et = PT ) + β8I(Et−1 = 0) + "t
(2.5)
where expert is actual years of work experience, I(educt = 2) and I(educt = 3)
are education category indicators for having completed high school and at least
some college, respectively, and "t is an i.i.d. wage unobservable which is distributed
normal with mean zero and variance σ2w to be estimated. Thus, wages grow if there
are substantial returns to work experience and fall if there are penalties for being out
of the workforce in the previous period or for working at a part-time job. Permanent
unobserved heterogeneity in wages is incorporated by allowing the offer intercept to
differ by unobserved type $.
2.2.5 Parental Health Transitions
Parental health is a crucial element in the model as it provides an important
channel for dynamics and helps to generate persistence in caregiving. The parent’s
health is assumed to be unaffected by informal care provided by the daughter.18
Thus, a woman does not provide care to change the healthy trajectory of her parent,
but because she derives direct utility from caregiving which varies with the parent’s
health state (i.e. caregiving is a consumption good). The health of the parent takes
on four discrete states: (1) Healthy; (2) Has any activities of daily living (ADL)
limitations or has a memory or cognition problem; (3) Cannot be left alone for an
hour or more; and (4) Death.19 Parental health is modeled as a Markov process,
which helps capture the fact that a parent’s need for care may be sporadic, sustained
18In the data, informal care provision is positively correlated with poor parental health. Health
transition estimates with informal care as an input imply that caregiving has no significant effect on
parental health or leads to worsening parental health. Byrne et al. (2009) estimate elderly health-
quality production functions and find informal care provided by children is relatively ineffective.
Thus, I abstract from allowing informal care to affect parental health.
19Activities of daily living include bathing, dressing and eating. The choice of health states is
motivated by the parental health information available in the HRS data.
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or intensified over the course of a caregiving episode. pijk denotes the probability that
the parent enters health status k where k ∈ {healthy,ADL, alone, death} in period
t+1, conditional on having been in health state j where j ∈ {healthy,ADL, alone}
in period t. The transition probabilities vary with the parent’s age and education.
Let Xpt be a vector of these parental characteristics. I then define the index variables
v(k|j) as follows:
v(k|j) = exp(γ′jkXpt ) for k = ADL, alone, death
= exp(0′Xpt ) = 1 for k = healthy
(2.6)
The Markov transition probabilities for the health status of the elderly parent in
t+ 1 are then defined by
pijk =
v(k|j)∑
k v(k|j)
The parameters of the health transition probabilities are estimated with a multino-
mial logit specification. The health transition matrix takes the following form20
t+ 1
t Healthy ADL Alone Death
Healthy pihealthy,healthy pihealthy,ADL pihealthy,alone pihealthy,death
ADL piADL,healthy piADL,ADL piADL,alone piADL,death
Alone pialone,healthy pialone,ADL pialone,alone pialone,death
Death 0 0 0 1
2.2.6 Dynamic Programming Problem
A woman’s objective in any period t is to maximize her expected lifetime utility
given by
max
dt∈Dt
Ut = E
[
T∑
t′=t
βt
′−tudt′ |St
]
(2.7)
20In the data there is recovery to better health states, so I do not restrict the transition matrix
to be diagonal. See the Appendix for a detailed discussion of the health transition estimation and
the average predicted transition matrix.
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where dt is the woman’s decision at time t, Dt is her decision set at time t which
varies depending on whether her parent is alive and her available job offers, udt is the
period utility from her decision at time t, T is the terminal period of the model,21 β
is the discount factor and St is a vector of the woman’s state variables. A woman’s
state variables include her last period’s employment decision, Et−1, her last period’s
caregiving decision, CGt−1, her age, aget, her years of work experience, expert, her
education, educt, her marital status, mart, whether she has a sister, sist, the vector
of her parent’s characteristics, Xpt , her parent’s realized health state at time t, H
p
t ,
and her type, $. In addition, utility from each choice depends on the realized wage
unobservable and unobserved utility arguments, denoted by vector !t. The vector
of state variables at time t is given by
St = {Et−1, CGt−1, aget, expert, educt,mart, sist,Xpt , Hpt , $, !t} (2.8)
The lifetime utility maximization problem given in equation 2.7 can be rewritten
in terms of value functions. The maximum expected value of discounted lifetime
utility at time t can be represented by the period t value function
Vt(St) = max
dt∈Dt
[Vdt(St)] (2.9)
where Vdt(St), the choice-specific expected lifetime value function, obeys the Bell-
man equation
Vdt(St) = udt + βE(Vt+1 (St+1|dt,St)) if t < T
Vdt(St) = udt if t = T (2.10)
Thus, the value of any decision at time t is a function of the period utility from
that choice plus the discounted expected value of future behavior given the woman’s
choice at time t. The expectation is taken over the distribution of future unobserved
21The terminal period occurs at age 70. At that time I do not allow the woman to work, but she
may make a final caregiving decision.
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utility from each choice and future wage unobservables as well as the parental health
transition probabilities and job offer probabilities.22
2.2.7 Solution Method
The dynamic programming problem is solved by backward recursion given a set
of model parameters. In the last period, expected values of the optimal choice are
calculated for each reachable state space ST and each potential choice set via Monte
Carlo simulation. For example, for a set of terminal period state variables ST , n
draws of the wage unobservable and unobserved utility arguments are drawn and
the maximum of the choice-specific value functions is calculated and recorded for
each draw.23 The average of the maximum value functions over the n draws is the
expected maximum value of arriving at time T with that choice set available and
state space ST . Moving back one period, that expected value is used to do the same
calculation for period T − 1, and this procedure is repeated until the first period is
reached. This process is described in greater detail in Keane and Wolpin (1994).
2.2.8 Model Summary
The model allows for current and long-term labor market effects of caregiving
in several ways. First, job offer probabilities depend on the woman’s prior work
decision. Thus, if a woman leaves work or decreases her work hours at some point
during a caregiving episode, she may face a reduced probability of receiving job
offers in future periods, and hence find it difficult to return to work or increase her
work hours. Second, wage offers depend on a woman’s years of work experience,
whether she worked last period and whether the offer is associated with a part-time
job. Thus, women who leave work while caregiving forgo returns to experience and
may face lower future wage offers due to human capital depreciation. In addition,
if women make adjustments on the intensive margin while caregiving and transition
22Women make decisions assuming their marital status will be the same next period, and that
whether they have a sister will be the same next period since fewer than 4 percent of women in
the data experience a change in marital status and fewer than 2 percent experience a change in
whether they have a living sister. This assumption can be relaxed in future work.
23Currently n = 175.
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to part-time work, they may face a lower wage offer. Third, the health transitions
are modeled in such a way that the parent’s health could improve, be sustained, or
deteriorate. As a result, the caregiving trajectory is uncertain and the associated
work adjustments (for example to non-work or part-time work) could potentially
last several periods.
2.3 Identification
Since only accepted job offers are observed, the econometrician typically cannot
distinguish whether a woman’s decision not to work was the result of rejecting a job
offer or not receiving an offer. Furthermore, if she receives a job offer, it is typically
difficult to distinguish whether rejection occurs because she has a high preference for
leisure or she received a low wage offer. A variety of assumptions allow for separate
identification of the utility from leisure, the wage offer parameters and the param-
eters of the job offer probabilities. Exclusionary restrictions and functional form
assumptions both help. For example, the job offer probabilities depend non-linearly
on whether the woman has reached age 62, but the utility from leisure is the same
for all women of a given type $, and wage offers depend continuously on age and aged
squared. Thus, if women age 62 and over are observed to work infrequently, this
would be explained by low job offer probabilities, not a higher preference for leisure
or lower wage offers. In addition, the job holding assumption helps to separately
identify the utility from leisure from the job offer parameters. A woman who works
full-time (part-time) is assumed to have a full-time (part-time) job offer with cer-
tainty in the next period, which means when a woman moves from full or part-time
work to non-work, the econometrician knows a job was available and the expected
wage offer. Thus, the utility from leisure can be identified by women transitioning
from full or part-time work to non-work, since non-work was chosen over an offered
wage. The offer probabilities are then separately identified by observed transitions
from non-work to full or part-time work, from part-time to full-time work, and from
full-time to part-time work.
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The utility from caregiving parameters are separately identified from the utility
from leisure in several ways. First, women who no longer have a parent alive only
make work choices, thus their leisure time is only a function of their work choice,
and their work decisions help to identify the utility from leisure. The assumed exo-
geneity of parental death allows the utility from leisure to be pinned down by this
subgroup of women. Second, the utility from leisure is assumed to be the same for
all women of a given type $, while utility from caregiving varies with the health
of the woman’s parent. Thus, if women with parents in a certain health state are
observed to caregive more than women with parents in another health state but
who are otherwise similar, this would be explained by differences in the utility from
caregiving over different health states, not by a lower preference for leisure.24 In
addition, utility from caregiving varies with whether the woman has a sister or not.
If women without sisters are observed to caregive more frequently than women with
sisters, this again would be explained by differences in the utility from caregiving,
not by a lower preference for leisure.
Identification of the wage offer parameters can be viewed as a sample selection
problem since only accepted wage offers are observed in the data. The solution to the
dynamic programming problem generates the sample selection rules (i.e. generates
an implicit reservation wage). The functional form, distributional and exclusion-
ary assumptions made in the model serve the same purpose as a sample selection
correction in either a two-step or full information maximum likelihood procedure
(Eckstein and Wolpin 1999). The distributional assumption is the normality of the
time-varying wage unobservable, "t, in the log wage offer function. In addition, the
model generates selection into work that is driven by observables besides those of the
wage offer. First, non-labor income which enters consumption varies with whether
the woman has reached age 62, her marital status and the interaction between the
two, but wage offers do not. Second, women with parents alive make a caregiving
24It is important to keep in mind that I assume caregiving does not affect the health transi-
tion probabilities. Thus, observing differences in caregiving frequency and intensity over different
parental health states is explained by differences in the utility from caregiving over these health
states, not by care provision affecting health transitions.
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choice which depends in part on their parents’ realized health state and whether
they have a sister, neither of which affect the wage offer. The caregiving choice is
made simultaneously with the work choice and different joint choices lead to differ-
ent amounts of leisure time. The caregiving choice, however, does not have a direct
impact on wage offers.
Last, permanent unobserved heterogeneity enters the model in two places. Un-
observed types differ in their utility from leisure and their wage offer intercept.25
The idea is to allow women to differ in permanent ways unobserved to the econome-
trician and estimate the distribution of types to fit the persistence of their choices
and observed wages. When two women who are equivalent in their observable char-
acteristics persistently make different choices or have persistently different accepted
wages, this implies they likely differ in unobservable characteristics. Thus, identifi-
cation of the unobserved type proportions is achieved through across group variation
in caregiving and work choices and wages. It is important to note that the inclu-
sion of unobserved heterogeneity introduces serially correlated state variables. For
example, the sum of the permanent heterogeneity component in the wage offer, β0,",
and the i.i.d. wage unobservable, "t, is a serially correlated state variable. Thus,
women can select into caregiving and work on the basis of persistent differences in
the utility from leisure and wage offers which are unobserved by the econometrician.
It should be noted that the assumption that the wage unobservable, "t, is i.i.d. is
important for identification of the wage penalty for not working in the prior period
(parameter β8).
2.4 Data and Empirical Implementation
The data are drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which is rep-
resentative of the non-institutional US population born between 1931 and 1941 and
their spouses. The HRS is a panel survey which provides longitudinal informa-
25I follow the usual convention in the dynamic programming literature of allowing for a small
number of types. The correlation in the two dimensions (i.e. leisure preferences and wage offers) is
restricted by allowing for two types.
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tion on labor supply, family structure, intergenerational transfers, health, income
and assets. The baseline interviews were completed for 12,654 individuals in 7,702
households in 1992. At that time, respondents were approximately 51 to 61 years
old or were married to individuals in that age range. Follow-up interviews took place
biennially. The HRS is well-suited for this study since it follows a large sample of
individuals at midlife over time, many of whom have elderly parents alive. In ad-
dition, it contains information on parents of all respondents, regardless of whether
the parent needs or is receiving care. Thus, I am able to examine the behavior of
women who do and do not provide care.
I restrict the sample to female HRS respondents between the ages of 42 and 70.
In addition, I restrict potential care recipients to be mothers and there are several
reasons for this restriction. First, only 21 percent of the women in the HRS report
having a father alive in the 1992 wave of the survey, whereas about 47 percent re-
port having a mother alive.26 In addition, fathers are less likely to receive care than
mothers (Hiedemann and Stern 1999, Byrne et al. 2009). In the HRS data, less than
one-third of the fathers ever receive care, but over one-half of the mothers receive
care at some point in the sample period. The sample is restricted to women who
report having a mother alive in the 1992 wave of the survey, and I use the 1994
through 2008 data for estimation of the model. The sample size is 3,094 women
with 18,066 person-wave observations.
2.4.1 Caregiving and Work Measures
Since the HRS interviews occur biennially, a decision period in the model corre-
sponds to two calendar years. In implementing the model, the total time available
in a decision period, T , is equal to 10,200 hours (14 hours per day times 730 days).
Thus, time allocated to caregiving and work is assigned based on two-year decision
periods.
The HRS asks respondents “Have you (or your husband/partner) spent 100 or
26By the 2000 survey wave, only 10 percent have a father alive, whereas 30 percent have a mother
alive.
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more hours in the past two years helping your parent(s)/step-parents with basic
personal needs like dressing, eating, and bathing?” The survey then asks who was
helped and how many hours of care the respondent and, separately her spouse pro-
vided. After 1992, respondents were also asked whether they or their spouses spent
a total of 100 or more hours in the past two years helping “with other things such as
household chores, errands, transportation, etc.” Again, the survey then asked who
was helped and how many hours of care were separately provided by the respondent
and her spouse. A woman is considered a caregiver if she has provided either type
of care, and the hours she has spent providing both types of care are summed to
determine whether she is a light or intensive caregiver. In the data, light caregivers
are defined as women who provide less than 1,000 hours of care over a two-year pe-
riod, and intensive caregivers are defined as those who provide 1,000 or more hours
of care over a two-year period. In the model, those who lightly caregive are assumed
to caregive for 300 hours per period, while those who intensively caregive provide
2,000 hours of care per period.27
Regarding employment status, a woman is considered to be working full-time if
she works 35 or more hours per week for 36 or more weeks per year; less than this is
considered part-time. In the model, those who work full-time are assumed to work
4,000 hours over the two-year period, while those who work part-time work 2,000
hours per period.28 A woman is considered to be not working if she is retired, un-
employed, or reports not being in the labor force. Respondents are asked to report
hourly wages if they are working. If the respondent reports her pay at a different
frequency, the RAND HRS data files adjust the pay rate appropriately using the
respondent’s reported usual hours worked per week and usual weeks worked per
year.
27Among those classified as light (intensive) caregivers the median hours of care over two years
is 300 (2,000) hours.
28In the data, the median hours worked per week by part-time (full-time) workers is 20 (40)
hours. For both types of workers, the median number of weeks worked per year is 50.
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2.4.2 Demographic and Parental Measures
The HRS contains detailed information on other variables that enter the estima-
tion such as the respondent’s education, years of work experience, non-labor income
and family structure. In terms of family structure, in each survey wave, the woman
reports her marital status, how many living siblings she has and the gender break-
down of those siblings. The woman reports various sources of non-labor income
including capital income, income from pensions and annuities, income from Social
Security Disability Insurance or SSI, income from Social Security retirement, spouse
or widow benefits, income from unemployment or worker’s compensation, income
from other government transfers and her spouse’s labor earnings (if she is married).
In terms of parental information, the HRS contains age and education data for
each respondent’s parent. The mother’s education is discretized into two categories—
less than a high school education versus high school graduate. In addition, the HRS
reports for each respondent’s parent whether he/she needs help with activities of
daily living, whether he/she can be left alone for an hour or more and in waves after
1996 whether the parent has a memory or cognition problem. The HRS does not
contain information about how many or which activities of daily living the parent
needs help with, but only that help is required with at least one activity.
2.4.3 Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity
Women enter the HRS sample at various ages during midlife. Thus, I observe
decisions beginning in the middle of the lifecycle that are conditioned on state
variables that arise from prior unobserved decisions. If these “initial” conditions are
not exogenous (i.e. if there is unobserved heterogeneity in preferences or constraints)
direct estimation will lead to bias.29 To account for this problem, I assume the
probabilities of the unobserved heterogeneity types can be represented by parametric
functions of the initial state variables. If the wage unobservables and unobserved
utility arguments are serially uncorrelated, the initial state variables are exogenous
29“Initial” conditions are those that exist at the time the woman is first observed in the sample.
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given type.30
The unobserved type probabilities also depend on initial conditions that are
not in the woman’s state space. Specifically, the type probabilities depend on the
woman’s initial log wage and initial discretized liquid assets. Liquid assets are
composed of the net value of the woman’s stocks, mutual funds and investment
trusts, her checking, savings and money market accounts, and her CDs and bonds.
Thus, savings enter the model through the unobserved heterogeneity, which allows
women who enter the model with low or high wealth to exhibit persistent differences
in caregiving and work choices. The specification of the type probability function is
given in the Appendix.
2.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for those without a mother alive and for
non-caregivers, light caregivers and intensive caregivers conditional on the woman’s
mother being alive.31 Light caregivers are about 2 percentage points less likely to be
working than non-caregivers whereas intensive caregivers are 11 percentage points
less likely to be working than non-caregivers. Both light and intensive caregivers are
about 2 percentage points more likely to be working part-time than non-caregivers.
While non-caregivers and light caregivers who are working appear to earn about
the same hourly wage, the average accepted wage for intensive caregivers is about
two dollars lower. Thus, the data seems to suggest a negative relationship between
caregiving and labor force participation that is particularly large for intensive care-
givers. Those with a mother no longer alive are older which likely explains why
almost 60 percent of this group is not working.
The data indicates that caregiving frequency and intensity vary with the health
of the mother. Non-caregivers are more likely to have healthy mothers than light
caregivers and intensive caregivers. Light caregivers are about 10 percentage points
more likely to have a mother who needs help with ADLs or has a memory or cog-
30Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) provide a detailed discussion of this initial conditions problem
and possible solutions, including the one described above.
31All dollar amounts are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index using 2008 as the base year.
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nition problem than non-caregivers. About two-thirds of intensive caregivers have
non-healthy mothers, and intensive caregivers are 16 percentage points more likely to
have a mother who cannot be left alone compared to both non- and light caregivers.
Table 2.2 shows the percentage of mothers in each health state that receive light or
intensive care from their daughters. Less than 30 percent of healthy mothers receive
informal care from their daughters and almost all care provided is light. Over half
the mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem receive care, and of
those receiving care, about a quarter of them are receiving intensive care from their
daughter. Caregiving for a mother who cannot be left alone for an hour or more is
less common than caring for a mother with ADL needs or a memory problem which
may reflect the increased caregiving burden when a parent cannot be left alone.32
However, over half the women providing care to a mother who cannot be left alone
are providing intensive care. By allowing the direct utility from caregiving and the
utility cost from initiating care to vary with the parent’s health state, the model
should be capable of matching these statistics.
Table 2.1 also indicates that non-caregivers are more likely to have a sister than
light and intensive caregivers, and light caregivers are more likely to have a sis-
ter than intensive caregivers. By allowing the utility from caregiving to vary with
whether the woman has a sister, the model should be able to match these statistics.
Caregivers are slightly better educated than non-caregivers and have more years of
work experience than non-caregivers, but are also slightly older on average.
32This may also reflect the mother receiving formal care either from a home aide or a nursing
home. The HRS does not contain data on formal home health care utilization by parents, but does
contain information about whether the mother resides in a nursing home at the time of the survey.
Formal home health care utilization is somewhat rare—approximately 13 to 14 percent of the non-
institutionalized elderly rely on formal (or paid) home health care (Johnson 2007, Kaye et al. 2010),
but generally in combination with informal care. In 2002, only 4 percent of the disabled elderly
relied solely on paid help (Johnson 2007). Nursing home usage is also rare, with only 8 percent of
the mothers in the estimation sample residing in a nursing home. The model has been estimated
including nursing home utilization, and the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those from the model presented.
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2.5 Estimation
I pursue a non-likelihood-based estimation strategy, efficient method of moments
(EMM), which is a type of indirect inference (see Gourieroux et al. 1993, Gallant and
Tauchen 1996). The basic idea is to fit simulated data obtained from the structural
model to an auxiliary statistical model. This auxiliary statistical model can be
easily estimated and must provide a complete enough statistical description of the
data to be able to identify the structural parameters. Following Tartari (2006) and
van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), the auxiliary model I use in estimation consists
of a combination of approximate decision rules that link endogenous outcomes of
the model and elements of the state space as well as structural relationships such
as the wage equation and job offer probabilities.
Specifically, using the actual data, yA, I estimate a set ofMA auxiliary statistical
relationships with parameters θA. By construction, at the maximum likelihood
estimates, θ̂A, the scores of the likelihood function, Lj for j = 1, . . . ,MA, are zero.
That is, ∂Lj∂θA,j = 0 where θA,j is the vector of model j’s parameters. Denoting θB the
parameters of the behavioral model, the idea behind EMM is the choose parameters
that generate simulated data, yB(θB), that make the score functions as close to zero
as possible. This is accomplished by minimizing the weighted squared deviations of
the score functions evaluated at the simulated data. Thus, the EMM estimator of
the vector of structural parameters θB is
θ̂B = argmin
θB
∂L
∂θA
(
yB(θB); θ̂A
)
Λ
∂L
∂θ′A
(
yB(θB); θ̂A
)
(2.11)
where Λ is a weighting matrix and ∂L∂θA
(
yB(θB); θ̂A
)
is a vector collecting the scores
of the likelihood functions across auxiliary models. The weighting matrix Λ is a block
diagonal matrix where each block is a consistent estimate of the inverse Hessian of
the corresponding auxiliary model evaluated at the actual data.
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2.5.1 Auxiliary Statistical Models
The solution of the optimization problem described is a set of decision rules in
which the optimal choice made in any period is a function of the state space in that
period. One class of auxiliary models used consists of parametric approximations
to these decision rules.33 Following van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), to keep
these approximations parsimonious, I do not include all the state variables. Instead,
I specify the decision rules as parametric functions of subgroups of state space
elements. A second set of auxiliary models comprises quasi-structural relationships
related to the wage equation and job offer probabilities. The following list consists
of auxiliary models used in estimation:
1. Multinomial logits of non-work, part-time work and full-time work on combina-
tions of age, age squared, experience, experience squared, education indicators,
indicators for last period’s employment decision, an indicator for reaching age
62 and a marital status indicator.
2. Logits of caregiving (any intensity) versus not caregiving on combinations of
parental health status indicators, an indicator for having a sister and lagged
caregiving for those with a mother alive.
3. Multinomial logits of no care, light care and intensive care on combinations of
parental health status indicators, an indicator for having a sister and lagged
caregiving for those with a mother alive.
4. Multinomial logits of the combined work-caregiving decision (9 choices total)
on combinations of experience, education indicators, lagged caregiving, indi-
cators for last period’s employment decision, an indicator for reaching age 62,
a marital status indicator, an indicator for having a sister and parental health
status indicators for those with a mother alive.
33For example, the utility function is unobserved to the econometrician so it is impossible to
provide auxiliary models which approximate the utility function itself. However, the outcome of
the utility function is a set of caregiving and work choices each period. Thus, auxiliary models that
are related to these choices will identify the utility function parameters.
69
5. Logit of transitions from not caregiving to caregiving (any intensity) on parental
health status indicators for those with a mother alive.
6. Logit of transitions from caregiving (any intensity) to not caregiving on parental
health status indicators for those with a mother alive.
7. Multinomial logits of transitions from non-employment to no work, part-time
work or full-time work; from part-time work to no work, part-time work or
full-time work; from full-time work to no work, part-time work or full-time
work on experience, education indicators and an indicator for reaching age 62.
8. Logits of transitions from non-full-time work to full-time work and from non-
part-time work to part-time work on an indicator for not working last period,
education indicators and an indicator for reaching age 62.
9. Regressions of log accepted wages on combinations of age, age squared, experi-
ence, experience squared, education indicators and indicators for last period’s
employment decision.
The auxiliary models imply 435 score functions which are used to identify 67 struc-
tural parameters.34 The structural parameters being estimated include the param-
eters of the utility function, job offer probabilities, wage offers, unobserved type
probabilities as well as the covariance matrix of the unobserved utility from each
choice and the variance of the wage unobservable.35
2.5.2 Simulating Data for Estimation
I perform path simulations as follows. At a given set of structural parameters,
having solved the optimization problem conditional on those parameters, I simulate
one-step-ahead decisions. That is, given the state variables of a woman in a given
period, I simulate her decisions by drawing a vector of the disturbances and choosing
34Estimates of the auxiliary parameters are not reported but are available upon request.
35As mentioned before, the parameters of the health transition probabilities are estimated outside
the structural model (i.e. outside the estimation algorithm).
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the alternative with the highest value function. The permanent unobserved hetero-
geneity is incorporated as follows. The probability that a simulated individual is
of a given type depends on her initial state variables. Given that probability, each
simulated observation is assigned a particular type by drawing randomly from the
type probability function. The score functions from the auxiliary models are then
evaluated using the simulated decisions and the criterion function is calculated.36 I
iterate on the parameters using the Nelder-Mead simplex method until the criterion
function is minimized.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates and standard errors are provided in Table 2.3. The model
allows for two types of women who differ in their utility from leisure and wage of-
fer intercept. The estimated distribution of types is 50.5 percent type 1 and 49.5
percent type 2. A number of estimates are worth highlighting and make clear the
static and dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers. First, the estimates
suggest initiating care provision is costly regardless of the mother’s health. In ad-
dition, direct utility from providing care is greater (or less negative) when mothers
are not healthy, and in particular when they have ADL needs or a memory or cog-
nition problem.37 Thus, those who start caregiving are likely to continue to do so,
especially if their mother is no longer healthy, since they have already incurred the
initiation cost. As a result, the model generates persistence in caregiving, an impor-
tant dynamic channel. A woman considers that if she provides care today, she will
36For the purpose of calculating the score function, I perform 60 simulations for each sample
observation and average that observation’s score functions over the simulations.
37The model was also estimated with nursing home utilization to see if nursing home use of
mothers who cannot be left alone was generating the observed ordering of caregiving utilities (for
example, α3 > α4). Nursing home use was modeled as follows. Nursing home utilization occurred
with some probability which depended on the mother’s realized health state and last period’s
nursing home use. A (dis)utility parameter from caregiving while the mother is in a nursing home
was introduced and estimated. The remaining caregiving utility parameter estimates were nearly
identical to those presented here without nursing home use incorporated. Results from estimation
of the model with nursing home use are available upon request.
71
likely to do so again next period, and she will make a work decision today which
accounts for this persistence in caregiving and the long-term tradeoffs it generates.
The estimates of the job offer probabilities underscore the importance of the
labor market frictions. The probability of receiving a part-time job offer given a
woman did not work in the previous period ranges from 7 to 13 percent, and the
probability of receiving a full-time job offer given a woman did not work in the
previous period ranges from 1 to 12 percent.38 Thus, women who do not work
are unlikely to receive offers the following period, making it difficult to return to
work. The probability of receiving a part-time job offer given a woman worked
full-time last period ranges from 27 to 41 percent. This probability is larger for
women who have reached the age of 62, which captures the observed fact that many
women transition from full to part-time work before retirement. The probability
of receiving a full-time job offer when a woman worked part-time in the previous
period ranges from 6 to 52 percent, and is larger for women who are younger than
62. These job offer probability estimates highlight important dynamic tradeoffs for
caregivers. Those who leave work to provide care face low probabilities of receiving
future offers, particularly full-time offers when over the age of 62, potentially leading
to withdrawal from the labor force earlier than desired or expected. In addition,
if a woman wishes to move from full to part-time work while providing care, such
an option is not always available, and she may have to choose between combining
full-time work with care responsibilities or not working. If she does work part-time
while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to move to full-time work in the
future, but is more likely to do so if she is younger.
The wage offer parameters are reasonable and as expected. There is a wage
penalty for not working in the previous period—a woman who did not work last
period can expect a 13 percent lower wage offer than an otherwise similar woman
who worked last period. These estimates also make clear static and dynamic trade-
offs between caregiving and work. Women who leave work to provide care forgo
38The 1 percent probability of receiving a full-time offer corresponds to women who have reached
the age of 62. Thus, the model can implicitly generate retirement (from full-time work) without
modeling an explicit retirement choice.
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experience and the associated wage returns, and also face a lower expected wage if
they return to work. The estimates suggest that part-time jobs are associated with
lower wage offers (β7 = −0.253), which is important since both light and intensive
caregivers are more likely to work part-time than non-caregivers. In addition, if a
woman is considering decreasing her work hours while caregiving she must consider
first that such an option may not be available (i.e. she may not receive a part-time
offer) and second that the decrease in hours will lead to a lower expected wage.
2.6.2 Model Fit
The parameter estimates are used to create a simulated sample consisting of 15
replicas of each sample individual’s initial state space variables. The model should fit
well the proportion of individuals working full-time, part-time or not all, the propor-
tion of individuals lightly and intensively caregiving and the proportion of combined
caregiving and work choices. Table 2.4 reports actual and simulated statistics of the
proportion of women working full-time, part-time or not at all by their caregiv-
ing status, conditional on the woman’s mother being alive. The model predictions
match the observed fact that light and intensive caregivers are more likely to be
in part-time work than non-caregivers, and that intensive caregivers are less likely
to be in full-time work than both non- and light caregivers. Table 2.5 reports the
actual and simulated proportions of combined caregiving and work choices, condi-
tional on the woman’s mother being alive. Generally, the model fits these choice
proportions well, but slightly overstates the proportion of women not working, re-
gardless of caregiving choice. Table 2.6 compares actual and simulated statistics for
the proportion of women lightly and intensively caregiving by the mother’s health
status. The model fits very well along these dimensions. In particular, it is able
to match the fact that intensive caregiving is more frequent for mothers who are
non-healthy, and that caregiving is most prevalent when a mother has ADL needs or
a memory or cognition problem. The model also fits accepted wages well, predicting
an average accepted log wage of 2.622 compared to 2.669 in the actual data.
Importantly, the model should not only fit choice proportions, but also transi-
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tions in caregiving and work status. Table 2.7 shows observed caregiving transitions
in the actual and simulated data. The model fits very well along these dimensions.
Specifically, the model matches the fact that about two-thirds of caregivers continue
caregiving (regardless of intensity) in the next period, conditional on the mother be-
ing alive next period. This prediction explicitly shows the persistence in caregiving
generated by the model. The model also fits well the proportion of women with
mothers alive who did not provide care in the previous period but caregive in the
current period (regardless of intensity). Last, the model matches well the proportion
of women who stop caregiving, due to either the death of the mother or the woman
stopping care provision. Table 2.8 compares observed employment transitions in
the actual and simulated data. The model fits these transitions well. The model
matches the fact that transitions from non-work to full or part-time work are rare,
and transitions from part-time to full-time work and vice versa occur with slightly
higher probability.
2.6.3 The Value of Elder Parent Care
The structural approach adopted in this paper allows for calculation of the value
(equivalently, the cost) of elder parent care, which reflects both the static and dy-
namic value of caregiving. To determine the value of elder parent care I implement
a counterfactual scenario in which women who would otherwise begin care provision
are not allowed to do so. Specifically, the parameter estimates are used to create a
simulated baseline sample consisting of 15 replicas of each sample individual’s initial
state space variables. The parameter estimates are then used again to create a simu-
lated sample of 15 replicas of each sample individual, but a woman is not allowed to
provide care (of either intensity) in the period in which she initiated care provision in
the baseline scenario. The removal of caregiving choices from the decision set comes
as a surprise to the woman in that period, and she must make the best choice that
does not involve providing care.39 She makes this decision expecting the caregiving
39Since women are surprised when they have the caregiving choices removed and the same draws
for the idiosyncratic shocks and unobserved utility arguments are used in the baseline and counter-
factual scenarios, all pre-caregiving outcomes are unchanged, in particular prior work decisions.
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choices to be available in all future periods. I then calculate the lump-sum trans-
fer needed to make a woman indifferent between her choice in the non-caregiving
counterfactual and her choice in the baseline in the period in which she initiated
care (i.e. the transfer needed to equalize the realized period value function in the
non-caregiving counterfactual to the realized period value function in the baseline
when she initiated care).40
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of transfer payments, excluding the top 90th
percentile of transfers. The median transfer is $66,370 per two-year period, which
is about half the cost of two years of nursing home care in a semi-private room
(MetLife 2010b). The transfers vary with the mother’s health in that period. The
median value of initiating care is $63,501 when a mother is healthy, $75,539 when
a mother has ADL needs or a memory problem and $64,929 when a mother cannot
be left alone. The value of initiating care provision is larger when a mother has
ADL needs or a memory problem for several reasons. First, the direct utility from
both light and intensive caregiving is largest for those with mothers in this health
state compared to the others. Second, mothers who have ADL needs or a memory
problem remain in that health state with 43 percent probability, transition to the
cannot be left alone health state with 18 percent probability, and transition to death
with 26 percent probability on average. Thus, the daughter is likely to provide care
next period since she will be able to again enjoy the direct utility from providing
care if her mother remains in that health state and the initiation cost will have
already been incurred. When a mother cannot be left alone she remains in that
health state with about 42 percent probability and transitions to death with about
39 percent probability on average. As a result, the probability of providing care
again next period is lower for these women. If her mother remains in the cannot
be left alone health state, she derives less direct utility from the second period of
caregiving than a woman whose mother has ADL needs or a memory problem. The
transfers reflect these dynamic channels that operate via the caregiving initiation
40The transfer is necessarily positive since the woman is forced to make a choice from a constrained
decision set in which the optimal choice is removed.
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costs and the parental health transitions.
The transfers described above incorporate the option value of initiating care in a
particular period since they are based on value function differences. If the transfers
were instead based only on period utility differences, the future benefits of starting
care would not be captured. I also calculate the transfer needed to equalize the
realized period utility function in the non-caregiving counterfactual to the realized
period utility function in the baseline when she initiated care. The median trans-
fer based on utility differences is $5,759 per two-year period, about eleven times
smaller than the transfer based on value function differences. These transfers are
lower since they incorporate the utility cost from initiating care, but not the benefits
from providing care in the future having already incurred this initiation cost. The
large difference between the static and dynamic transfers highlights the importance
of the forward-looking behavior in the model and the intertemporal nature of care-
giving and work decisions.
Several previous studies, particularly in the gerontology literature, have also as-
signed a monetary value to informal care. However, these studies typically calculate
this value by multiplying the average hours of care provided by the average or me-
dian wage of a home health aide (the replacement wage approach), the minimum
wage or some average of the two (Ernst and Hay 1994, Arno et al. 1999, Chappell
et al. 2004, Feinberg et al. 2011). For example, Feinberg et al. (2011) estimate the
economic value of informal care based on caregivers providing an average of 18.4
hours of care per week at an average value of $11.16 per hour, which amounts to an
approximate value of $21,356 over two years. This value is substantially lower than
the median transfer I calculate above based on value function differences. Johnson
and LoSasso (2000) perform a back of the envelope calculation and find the loss in
annual work hours for female caregivers in the US translates on average into about
$7,800 in lost wages per year in 1994 dollars, or $22,663 over two years in 2008
constant dollars, similar to that found in Feinberg et al. (2011). Ernst and Hay
(1994) find the net cost of informal care for an Alzheimer’s patient is $20,900 per
year in 1991 dollars, or $66,076 over two years in 2008 dollars. This value is larger
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than those of the other studies since they estimate the weekly hours of informal
care per week at 52.5, which is substantially higher than that found in most stud-
ies and the sample used in this paper. Their methodology based on 20 hours of
care provision per week produces a value of $33,866 over two years. The structural
approach employed in this paper allows for calculating a value of caregiving which
incorporates the direct utility from providing care, the utility cost from initiating
care, parental health transitions and the option value of providing care. These fea-
tures are not reflected in the approaches used in the above-mentioned studies, and
it appears calculations based on the replacement wage approach or current foregone
wages substantially underestimate the value of elder parent care.
2.7 Policy Experiments
One of the goals of this paper is to use the structural estimates to analyze how
various government sponsored elder care policies affect a woman’s caregiving and
work decisions. For each policy I simulate a dataset using 15 replicas of each sample
individual’s initial state space variables and compare the results to those of the
baseline dataset simulated without the policy experiments.41 I consider 3 policies:
a two-year unpaid leave, a two-year paid leave (under different payment schemes)
and a caregiver allowance for intensive caregivers.42
2.7.1 Unpaid Leave
Currently in the US, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 allows
workers to take up to a 12-week unpaid leave to care for an ill family member and
guarantees the worker will return to his/her job at the same wage. According to
the US Department of Labor, only 10.6 percent of leave-takers utilized the FMLA
to care for an ill parent in 2000 (Cantor et al. 2001) and most studies attribute this
41I use the same draws for the idiosyncratic shocks and unobserved utility arguments in the
baseline and policy simulations.
42Throughout the analysis of the policy experiments, it is important to keep in mind the partial
equilibrium setup of the model. The demand side of the labor market is considered completely
exogenous. Thus, I assume employers do not adjust their behavior in response to the counterfactual
policies.
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low take-up to the short duration and unpaid status of the leave time. Motivated by
the fact that an average caregiving spell lasts about four years (National Alliance
for Caregiving and AARP 2009), the first policy experiment involves an unpaid
work leave longer than the 12 weeks currently allowed under the FMLA. The policy
experiment allows a woman to take a two-year unpaid leave from work to caregive
intensively for her mother. Family work leaves of such lengths (and sometimes
longer) are common in several European countries, such as Austria, Bulgaria and
Germany. The policy is implemented as follows: Women who worked in the previous
period (either full or part-time) have the option of caregiving intensively and not
working during the current period with a guarantee that they will have a job offer
(for the type of job they left) with certainty in the following period with no wage
penalty for not working during the leave.43 Thus, the leave alleviates a woman from
combining work and intensive caregiving for a period, but she forgoes her labor
income for that period. At the same time, the leave eliminates the uncertainty
about returning to work since her job is held for her during the leave.
About 33 percent of women who are eligible take the unpaid leave, where eligible
means the woman worked last period and is intensively caregiving in the current
period. About 19 percent of women who intensively caregive are doing so while
on leave. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9 report the proportion of women providing
intensive care by the mother’s health status in the baseline simulation and in the
unpaid leave simulation. The unpaid leave generates modest increases in intensive
care provision.
There is evidence that the leave helps women to better maintain employment
during and after a caregiving spell. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.10 report the
employment status of women during and after intensive care provision in the baseline
simulation and the unpaid leave simulation. The leave induces more work, especially
full-time work, among these ever intensive caregivers compared to the baseline where
women do not have the unpaid leave available. Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of
43The leaves are aimed at women facing substantial caregiving burden and are not available to
light caregivers.
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unpaid leave-takers in full and part-time work in the years before and after they take
the leave compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline when the leave is
not available. Women seem to take the unpaid leave at a time in the baseline when
intensive care provision induces them to leave work, particularly full-time work.
About 39 percent of those who take the leave left work in the equivalent period in
the baseline, and there is no evidence in the baseline simulation that these women
return to work. The unpaid leave, however, returns women to work and many of
them continue working for several periods. There is a 49 (27) percent increase in
the proportion of women in full-time (part-time) work in periods after the leave
is taken compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline. Thus, it appears
allowing women to take a leave to intensively caregive but removing the uncertainty
about the availability of job offers after the leave encourages more full and part-time
work for these women compared to when such a leave is unavailable. These results
highlight the importance of labor market frictions for these caregivers.
2.7.2 Paid Leave
The second policy experiment is similar to the leave described above except the
woman receives a lump-sum payment while on leave to intensively caregive, and the
payment is linked to the health of the care recipient. Currently in the US, California
and New Jersey have implemented paid family leave programs, but caregivers can
only take a leave for a maximum of 6 weeks, and payment is tied to the worker’s
wage. Payments to caregivers are very common in Europe and Canada,44 and pay-
ments to care recipients that are indexed to their health or level of need are also
common.45 I consider a combination of these pre-existing policies in that the pay-
ment is provided directly to the caregiver while on leave, and the payment varies
with the health of her mother.
44For example, the Swedish Temporary Care Leave pays a caregiver 80 percent of her normal
labor income for a maximum leave of 60 days. Canada’s Compassionate Care Benefit pays 55
percent of a caregiver’s average earnings for up to six weeks while she cares for a terminally ill
family member. Ireland’s Carer’s Benefit pays a maximum of 205 euros per week for up to 104
weeks to caregivers who leave work to “care for a person in need of full-time care and attention.”
45For example, Austria’s Cash Allowance for Care, Germany’s Cash Allowance for Care, Luxem-
bourg’s Cash Allowance for Care and the United Kingdom’s Attendance Allowance.
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I simulate the paid leave under two payment schemes. The first pays $6,600 to
women who intensively care for mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cogni-
tion problem and $13,200 to women who intensively care for mothers who cannot
be left alone. These amounts are loosely based on the range of monthly payments
that exist under Germany’s Cash Allowance for Care extrapolated to a two-year pe-
riod. The second payment system pays $18,250 to women who intensively care for
mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem and $36,500 to women
who intensively care for mothers who cannot be left alone.46 These amounts are
based on the recently suspended CLASS Act, which aimed to create a voluntary
government insurance benefit to provide long-term care support. Benefits were to
be triggered once a participant needed ADL help or comparable assistance because
of cognitive impairment. The law specified the average minimum benefit be $50 per
day with benefit amounts to be scaled based on the level of impairment.47 I take a
conservative approach and provide $25 per day for two years to women caring for
mothers with ADL needs or a memory problem and $50 per day for two years to
women caring for mothers who cannot be left alone.
Under the first payment scheme, about 39 percent of eligible women take the
paid leave, and not surprisingly even more take the leave under the second payment
scheme (46 percent). Table 2.9 shows that the paid leaves, particularly under the
second payment scheme, generate somewhat larger increases in intensive care pro-
vision than the unpaid leave. Table 2.10 shows that the employment effects of the
paid leave on women during and after intensive care provision are nearly identical
to those of the unpaid leave both qualitatively and quantitatively. Figure 2.3 shows
the proportion of paid leave-takers under the second payment scheme in full and
part-time work in the years before and after they take the leave compared to the
corresponding periods in the baseline when the leave is not available. There is a
46Under both payments schemes, women who intensively care for healthy mothers can take a
leave, but do not receive a payment. I make this assumption since the European and Canadian
policies typically require the care recipient to have sufficient need for care.
47CLASS Act legislation took effect in January 2011, but in October 2011, the Obama admin-
istration announced the program would not be implemented. For a detailed discussion of CLASS
Act, see Munnell and Hurwitz (2011).
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40 (26) percent increase in the proportion of women in full-time (part-time) work
in periods after the paid leave is taken compared to the corresponding periods in
the baseline. Again, these results are similar to those of the unpaid leave. Thus,
the main differences between the unpaid leave and the paid leaves are the take-up
rate and subsequently how much intensive care provision the policies induce and
government expenditure on the leave payments.
2.7.3 Caregiver Allowance
The last policy experiment provides a payment to women who intensively care-
give for their non-healthy mothers that is not linked to their employment status
and may be received indefinitely. This policy experiment can inform about the la-
bor market effects that would have occurred if the care recipient under the CLASS
Act transferred the benefit payment in full to her caregiving daughter. The payment
amounts are identical to those of the second paid leave payment scheme—$18,250
for intensively caregiving for a mother with ADL needs or a memory or cognition
problem and $36,500 for intensively caregiving for a mother who cannot be left
alone. As seen in Table 2.9, the caregiver allowance generates the largest increase in
intensive care provision among all the policies considered compared to the baseline.
Two channels may be driving these results—first, the policy does not require the
woman to not be working to receive the payment and second, the payment can be
received indefinitely. I decompose this policy and simulate it under the leave rules,
meaning a woman can receive the payment at most every other period, rather than
indefinitely as long as she is providing intensive care. The decomposition shows
that the large increases in care provision are due mainly to the fact that unlike the
previous policies discussed, the woman does not have to leave work to caregive and
receive the payment. At the same time, this policy discourages work among inten-
sive caregivers due to the income effect of receiving this payment indefinitely. Table
2.10 shows that the caregiver allowance leads to a 2.5 percentage point increase in
non-work among women who ever provide intensive care, which is mostly due to a
reduction in full-time work.
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2.7.4 Retirement Effects of Policies
Since a caregiver is typically in her fifties and sometimes in her early sixties, the
policy experiments may have important retirement effects. Table 2.11 shows the em-
ployment status of women who are between the ages of 62 (the Social Security early
entitlement age) and 70 who ever provided intensive care in the baseline simulation,
the work leave policy simulations and the caregiver allowance simulation. Both the
unpaid and paid leaves slightly increase the proportion of women 62 and over who
are working part-time compared to the baseline, and lead to moderate increases in
full-time work compared to the baseline. The caregiver allowance slightly decreases
the percentage of women working full-time age 62 and over. Thus, it appears the
work leaves reduce some early withdrawal from the labor force for women who have
ever provided intensive care.
The retirement effects are stronger for the group of women who ever took a leave
at some point in the simulations. Table 2.12 compares the employment status of
women 62 and over in the baseline simulation and the policy simulations who ever
took an unpaid leave or paid leave. The leaves decrease non-work by about 16 to 17
percentage points compared to the baseline, which suggests the leaves are effective
in preventing early retirement for many of these leave-takers. Given that the aver-
age age of a leave-taker is 57 or 58, these results show that the one period removal
of uncertainty regarding the ability of a caregiver to return to work has effects for
several periods. In addition, the unpaid leave is just as effective as the paid leaves
in encouraging work after age 62 for leave-takers, which is an important considera-
tion for policy makers who may aim to protect the employment of caregivers while
minimizing the government expenditure needed to do so.
2.7.5 Welfare Comparison of Policies
Using the structure of the model, I determine the value of the various policy
experiments for those who take up the policy. I calculate the lump-sum transfer
needed to equalize the woman’s realized period value function in the baseline (with-
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out any policies available) to her realized value function in the policy experiment
scenario in the period in which she takes up the policy being analyzed.48 Table 2.13
shows the median value of each policy experiment for all women who take up each
particular policy, for the subset of women who take up the policy and were already
intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the baseline and for women who
were induced to provide intensive care by the policy. About 50 to 60 percent of the
median value of the paid leave under the larger payment scheme can be achieved
with the unpaid leave, which suggests much of the benefit of the paid leaves comes
from the guarantee that the woman can return to work. In addition, the unpaid
leave generates comparable welfare gains to the caregiver allowance policy which
does not require a woman to leave work to receive the payment. These results fur-
ther emphasize the importance of the labor market frictions for caregivers and the
benefit of eliminating the uncertainty regarding the availability of full and part-time
jobs.
Interesting patterns emerge when comparing the welfare gains for the subgroup
of women who are induced to intensively caregive by each policy. Those induced
to intensively caregive by the paid leave under the smaller payment scheme exclud-
ing those caregiving for healthy mothers enjoy about $10,000 more in welfare than
those induced to intensively caregive by the unpaid leave, which lies between the
$6,600 and $13,200 leave payments. Those induced to intensively caregive by the
paid leave under the larger payment scheme excluding those caregiving for healthy
mothers enjoy about $9,000 more in welfare than those induced to intensively care-
give by the paid leave with the smaller payments, which is less than the $11,650 and
$23,300 increase in leave payments. This can be explained in part by the differential
take-up of the leaves. As the payments increase across the leaves, more women take
them and are induced to intensively caregive. These marginal leave-takers necessar-
ily value the leaves less than women who take all three leaves. The median value
of the caregiver allowance for women induced to intensively caregive by this policy
48The transfer is calculated for the period in which a woman takes a leave for the unpaid and
paid leave experiments and during periods of intensive care provision for an unhealthy mother for
the caregiver allowance experiment.
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is only slightly larger than the $18,250 payment and well below the $36,500 pay-
ment for those with mothers who cannot be left alone. This value is also below the
median value of the unpaid leave for those induced to intensively caregive by that
policy. These results have important implications for policy makers who may be
concerned with balancing government expenditure with the welfare gains generated
by the policies, particularly for women induced to intensively care by the policies.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed and estimated a dynamic discrete choice model
of caregiving and work to study how elder parent care affects a woman’s labor force
participation and wages over the short and long-term. In contrast to the previ-
ous literature, I model caregiving and work decisions in an explicitly intertemporal
framework. Women make forward-looking decisions in a model which incorporates
several dynamic elements such as parental health changes, human capital accumu-
lation and labor market frictions. I explicitly model the uncertainty women face
about their parent’s health and the availability of full and part-time jobs.
The model is estimated using data from the Health and Retirement Study by
efficient method of moments. Based on the estimates, the model was shown to rea-
sonably fit many aspects of the data. The estimates highlight various static and
dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers. Women who begin care provi-
sion are likely to continue to do so, especially if their parent is in poor health. In
addition, women are more likely to provide intensive care when their parent is no
longer healthy, and intensive caregivers are less likely to be working. The estimates
also underscore the importance of labor market frictions. Women who do not work
face low probabilities of receiving job offers in the future. As a result, if a woman
leaves work while caregiving she may find it difficult to return. If she works part-
time while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to increase her hours in the
future. The wage offer estimates show women who leave work forgo experience and
the associated wage returns, and also face a lower expected wage if they return to
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work. In addition, part-time work is associated with lower wage offers, and care-
givers are more likely to be in part-time work than non-caregivers.
The model structure and estimates were used to calculate the value of elder
parent care. The median value of initiating care was found to be $66,370 over two-
years, about half the cost of two years of nursing home care, but two to three times
larger than the values found in the previous literature. These previous values were
calculated using the replacement wage approach or current foregone wages from pro-
viding care, and do not reflect the dynamic value of initiating care provision. Thus,
calculations that ignore forward-looking behavior and the intertemporal nature of
caregiving and work underestimate the value of elder parent care.
The estimates were used to analyze three counterfactual policy experiments: a
two-year unpaid work leave, a two-year paid work leave and a caregiver allowance
for intensive caregivers. The leaves generate modest increases in intensive caregiving
and substantial decreases in non-work among women during and after intensive care
provision, further highlighting the importance of the labor market frictions. There
is also evidence that the leaves reduce early withdrawal from the labor force. The
caregiver allowance on the other hand generates substantial increases in intensive
care provision but seems to discourage work among those who ever intensively care-
give. A comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows that about
half the value of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave, and the
caregiver allowance generates gains comparable to the unpaid leave. The welfare
gains generated by the unpaid leave alone emphasize the benefit of guaranteeing
a caregiver can return to work. The policy experiments illustrate the existence of
potential important tradeoffs faced by policy makers if they wish to both protect the
employment of caregivers and encourage informal care provision, as well as balance
government expenditure with the welfare gains generated by the policies.
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2.9 Chapter 2 Appendix
2.9.1 Utility Function
The period utility function is given by
ut = ln(Ct) + α1," ln(Lt) + αCG,Hp + αCG,CG−1 + αCG,sis + νt,E,CG
where
α1," = α1,1I(type = 1) + α1,2I(type = 2)
and
αCG,Hp = α2I(CGt = 1)I(H
p
t = healthy) + α3I(CGt = 1)I(H
p
t = ADL)
+α4I(CGt = 1)I(Hpt = alone) + α5I(CGt = 2)I(H
p
t = healthy)
+α6I(CGt = 2)I(Hpt = ADL) + α7I(CGt = 2)I(H
p
t = alone)
and
αCG,CG−1 = α8I(CGt "= 0)I(CGt−1 = 0)I(Hpt = healthy)
+α9I(CGt "= 0)I(CGt−1 = 0)I(Hpt = ADL)
+α10I(CGt "= 0)I(CGt−1 = 0)I(Hpt = alone)
and
αCG,sis = α11I(CGt "= 0)I(sist = 1)I(Hpt = healthy)
+α12I(CGt "= 0)I(sist = 1)I(Hpt = ADL)
+α13I(CGt "= 0)I(sist = 1)I(Hpt = alone)
The direct utility from not caregiving is normalized to zero across all health states.
2.9.2 Non-Labor Income
Non-labor income is assumed to arrive from a degenerate distribution that de-
pends on a woman’s education, age and marital status. Outside the structural
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model, I estimate a linear regression of logged non-labor income on education cat-
egory indicators, an indicator for whether the woman is married, an indicator for
being over the age of 62, an interaction term between marital status and being over
the age of 62, and an interaction between not working and being over the age of 62.
Non-labor income is measured as the sum of capital income, income from pensions
and annuities, income from Social Security Disability Insurance or SSI, income from
Social Security retirement, spouse or widow benefits, income from unemployment
or worker’s compensation, income from other government transfers and her spouse’s
labor earnings if she is married. Non-labor income depends on whether the woman
is over the age of 62 since she can begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits
at that age. The interaction term between marital status and achieving the Social
Security early entitlement age is meant to capture the drop in her spouse’s labor
earnings once he retires as well as his potential receipt of Social Security benefits.
Every period in the model, the woman receives non-labor income based on her
characteristics as generated by the following equation:
ln(yt) =γ0 + γ1I(educt = 2) + γ2I(educt = 3) + γ3I(mart = 1) + γ4I(aget ≥ 62)
+ γ5I(mart = 1)I(aget ≥ 62) + γ6I(aget ≥ 62)I(Et = 0)
(2.12)
Thus, I provide the daughter with the average non-labor income women with her
characteristics have in the data. The estimates from the non-labor income regression
are reported in Table 2.14.
2.9.3 Parental Health Transitions
I follow Palumbo (1999) and estimate the coefficients of the parental health tran-
sitions for three different multinomial logit models: one for each of the three health
states being conditioned upon (j = healthy,ADL, alone). That is, I essentially cre-
ate three different datasets and estimate a different multinomial logit specification
for each. The first dataset includes the parent’s health status in t+ 1 and parental
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characteristics for all parents that were healthy at time t. The second and third
datasets include parents that needed ADL help or had a memory problem and those
who could not be left alone for an hour or more at time t, respectively. The multino-
mial logit coefficients are estimated relative to being healthy in t+ 1 since γj,healthy
is normalized to zero for j = {healthy,ADL, alone} as seen in equation 2.6. The
parameters and standard errors from the multinomial logit estimation are reported
in Table 2.15. The average predicted health transition matrix is given below.
t+ 1
t Healthy ADL Alone Death
Healthy 0.799 0.087 0.045 0.069
ADL 0.124 0.432 0.181 0.263
Alone 0.100 0.095 0.416 0.389
Death 0 0 0 1
2.9.4 Unobserved Type Probability Function
Pr(type = $) =
exp(µ"Ω)
1 +
∑2
m=2 exp(µmΩ)
$ ∈ {1, 2} (2.13)
where
µ"Ω =µ"0 + µ
"
1I(E−1 = PT ) + µ
"
2I(E−1 = FT ) + µ
"
3I(mar0 = 1) + µ
"
4age0
+ µ"5 lnw0 + µ
"
6I(w0 = 0) + µ
"
7I(asset0 = 2) + µ
"
8I(asset0 = 3)
where E−1 is the work choice of the woman preceding the period in which she enters
the sample (period t = 0). Recall that I do not use the 1992 survey wave data in the
estimation, but the work choice of a woman observed in 1992 serves as her previous
period’s employment choice when she enters the estimation sample. If the woman
enters the model with no wage (either because she did not work or the wage was
not reported), she is assigned the average log wage observed in the data, and an
indicator variable denotes that she entered without a wage. The woman’s initial
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liquid assets are discretized into terciles. Coefficients for type 1 are all normalized
to zero.
2.9.5 Contrast Across Methods
In the first chapter, we examine the effect of informal care on labor force par-
ticipation, retirement, as well as work hours and wages conditional on working. We
allow for permanent unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects; thus, we allow the
time-invariant individual-specific heterogeneity to be correlated with caregiving and
other explanatory variables. We address the fact that even after controlling for fixed
effects, there may be remaining endogeneity concerns if the individual- and time-
varying unobservables are correlated with time-varying caregiving behavior. The
identifying instruments we use include “ill-health” of a parent, defined as needing
assistance with activities of daily living, having a memory problem, or not being
able to be left alone. We also use information about potential alternative sources of
informal care provision, mainly through whether the parent or in-law was recently
widowed.
We argue that variation in the health of a parent or in-law should directly vary
the demand for informal care, but not directly affect work behavior of an adult
child other than through the informal care path. Concerns about intergenerational
transmission of poor health should be alleviated by the fact that we control for the
adult child’s own health and by the inclusion of the fixed effect. Having a parent
or in-law who is widowed means their spouse is not available to assume the care-
giving role, thereby increasing the demand for care provided by an adult child or
child-in-law. The recent passing of a parent or in-law potentially explains much of
the termination of care provision. The passing of a parent or in-law should only
affect work behavior of an adult child via the termination of care provision for that
parent or in-law or the provision of care for the widowed parent or in-law. Coe and
Van Houtven (2009) find the death of a parent does not have a direct effect on one’s
health or depressive symptoms, which alleviates concerns that the death of a parent
or in-law could influence work behavior via the bereavement effect.
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In the second chapter, I also rely on the mother’s health as a source of exoge-
nous variation that explains caregiving behavior. In the model, women derive utility
from light and intensive caregiving that varies with the health of the mother, and I
assume caregiving does not affect the parental health transitions. Thus, like in the
first chapter, variation in the health of the mother directly varies informal care de-
cisions, but does not directly affect work decisions other than through the informal
care path and its expected trajectory. In fact, if I implemented a counterfactual
in which women were no longer allowed to make caregiving decisions, the mother’s
health would no longer have any role in the model.
Most important, in the second chapter, the solution to the dynamic programming
problem provides dynamic selection rules into caregiving and work. Selection oc-
curs on observables such as education, age, the mother’s health, etc.; time-invariant
unobservables via the permanent unobserved heterogeneity that is modeled as two
unobserved types who differ in their utility from leisure and wage offer intercepts;
and, time-varying unobservables including those of the utility function to each choice
in the model and in the wage offer function. The functional form, distributional and
exclusionary assumptions embedded throughout the model serve the same purpose
as a sample selection correction in either a two-step or full information maximum
likelihood procedure.
90
2.10 Chapter 2 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mother Not Non- Light Intensive
Alive Caregiver Caregiver Caregiver
Employment
% Not working 59.35 41.69 43.55 52.54
% Working part-time 16.38 17.47 19.46 19.15
% Working full-time 24.27 40.85 36.99 28.31
Mean accepted wagea $21.09 $20.74 $20.31 $18.16
Mother’s Health
% Healthy 75.25 64.97 35.87
% ADL needs or memory problem 12.63 22.82 35.73
% Cannot be left alone 12.12 12.20 28.39
Demographics and Family Structure
Mean age 62.07 56.76 58.53 59.81
% Married 77.99 81.90 80.61 74.93
% Has sister 71.90 75.05 69.10 61.22
% Less than HS education 21.81 20.48 14.48 14.27
% HS degree 40.22 38.07 43.04 41.97
% Some college 37.96 41.45 42.48 43.77
Mean years of experience 26.25 23.94 26.21 27.02
N 7,125 7,187 3,032 722
a Conditional on working.
Table 2.2: Parental Health and Caregiving
Healthy ADL Needs Alone
% Not caregiving 70.81 48.87 60.23
% Lightly caregive 25.80 37.24 25.59
% Intensively caregive 3.39 13.89 14.18
N 7,637 1,858 1,446
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Table 2.3: Main Parameter Estimates
Description Parameter Estimate S.E.
Utility Parameters
Leisure (Type 1) α1,1 1.532 0.011
Leisure (Type 2) α1,2 2.056 0.067
Light caregiving when Hp = healthy α2 -0.266 0.021
Light caregiving when Hp = ADL α3 0.304 0.009
Light caregiving when Hp = alone α4 -0.225 0.025
Intensive caregiving when Hp = healthy α5 -1.047 0.037
Intensive caregiving when Hp = ADL α6 0.156 0.017
Intensive caregiving when Hp = alone α7 0.022 0.027
Initiating care when Hp = healthy α8 -1.916 0.016
Initiating care when Hp = ADL α9 -1.893 0.030
Initiating care when Hp = alone α10 -1.540 0.054
Caregiving and has a sister when Hp = healthy α11 -0.160 0.021
Caregiving and has a sister when Hp = ADL α12 -0.162 0.024
Caregiving and has a sister when Hp = alone α13 -0.318 0.047
Log Wage Offer Parameters
Intercept (Type 1) β0,1 0.351 0.001
Intercept (Type 2) β0,2 0.378 0.003
Age β1 0.058 9.74E-06
Age squared β2 -0.0006 1.01E-06
Experience β3 0.046 3.07E-05
Experience squared β4 -0.0006 1.44E-06
HS degree β5 0.251 0.006
Some college β6 0.658 0.005
Part-time β7 -0.253 0.004
Did not work last period β8 -0.132 0.005
Variance of wage unobservable σ2w 0.437 0.001
Part-Time Job Offer Logit Parameters
Intercept λPT0 -0.992 0.013
Did not work last period λPT1 -1.556 0.058
Age 62+ λPT2 0.376 0.049
HS degree λPT3 0.263 0.030
Some college λPT4 0.072 0.027
Full-Time Job Offer Logit Parameters
Intercept λFT0 -0.227 0.030
Did not work last period λFT1 -2.101 0.068
Age 62+ λFT2 -2.526 0.293
HS degree λFT3 0.289 0.058
Some college λFT4 0.300 0.047
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Description Parameter Estimate S.E.
Unobserved Type Probability Parameters
Type 2: Intercept µ20 -0.051 0.105
Type 2: Worked part-time before initial period µ21 1.026 0.997
Type 2: Worked full-time before initial period µ22 -2.120 0.121
Type 2: Marital status at initial period µ23 -0.116 0.036
Type 2: Age at initial period µ24 0.012 4.87E-04
Type 2: Initial log wage µ25 0.074 0.016
Type 2: No initial log wage µ26 0.025 0.104
Type 2: Initial asset tercile 2 µ27 0.604 0.130
Type 2: Initial asset tercile 3 µ28 -0.225 0.233
Other Parameters
Discount factor (not estimated) β 0.95
Covariance Matrix for Unobserved Utility Arguments
This matrix governs the unobserved utility from each joint caregiving and work
choice when women have a mother alive:
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ν0,0 ν0,1 ν0,2 νPT,0 νPT,1 νPT,2 νFT,0 νFT,1 νFT,2
ν0,0 1.000
ν0,1 −0.618 1.913
(0.019) (0.023)
ν0,2 −0.291 0.162 1.335
(0.039) (0.029) (0.023)
νPT,0 −0.010 0.00 0.00 0.563
(0.059) (0.036)
νPT,1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.272 2.525
(0.035) (0.041)
νPT,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.369 1.175 2.065
(0.104) (0.065) (0.068)
νFT,0 −0.065 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.087
(0.065) (0.079)
νFT,1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.770 1.696
(0.042) (0.023)
νFT,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.184 −0.483 1.160
(0.053) (0.056) (0.052)
where the unobserved utility from each choice vE,CG are assumed to be distributed
multivariate normal with mean zero and covariance-variance matrix estimated above.
The variance of the unobserved utility from not working and not caregiving has been
normalized to one. In the estimates reported above, most covariances of unobserved
utility across work choices are set equal to zero. This restriction will be relaxed in
future work.
This matrix governs the unobserved utility from each work choice when women
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do not have a mother alive:
ν0 νPT νFT
ν0 1.000
νPT 0.030 0.343
(0.023) (0.042)
νFT −0.846 0.00 1.272
(0.039) (0.120)
where the unobserved utility vE are assumed to be distributed multivariate normal
with mean zero and covariance-variance matrix estimated above. The variance of
the unobserved utility from not working has been normalized to one.
Table 2.4: Employment Status by Caregiving Type
Non-Caregiver Light Caregiver Intensive Caregiver
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
% Not working 41.69 46.12 43.55 46.67 52.54 53.35
% Working part-time 17.47 16.34 19.46 18.59 19.15 17.85
% Working full-time 40.85 37.54 36.99 34.74 28.31 28.80
Table 2.5: Joint Caregiving and Work Choices
Actual Simulated
% Not working, not caregiving 27.42 29.30
% Not working, light caregiving 12.05 13.77
% Not working, intensive caregiving 3.44 3.72
% Working part-time, not caregiving 11.49 10.38
% Working part-time, light caregiving 5.38 5.49
% Working part-time, intensive caregiving 1.25 1.24
% Working full-time, not caregiving 26.87 23.85
% Working full-time, light caregiving 10.24 10.25
% Working full-time, intensive caregiving 1.85 2.01
Table 2.6: Caregiving by Mother’s Health Status
Healthy ADL Needs Alone
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
% Lightly caregiving 25.80 28.13 37.24 36.59 25.59 25.52
% Intensively caregiving 3.39 3.64 13.89 13.92 14.18 14.58
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Table 2.7: Caregiving Transitions
Actual Simulated
% Caregivers who care again next period 68.00 66.96
% Transitioning from non-caregiving to caregiving 22.40 22.82
% Transitioning from caregiving to non-caregiving 42.43 44.17
Table 2.8: Employment Transitions
Et = 0 Et = PT Et = FT
Et−1 = 0
89.48 (A) 6.64 (A) 3.87 (A)
90.14 (S) 6.35 (S) 3.51 (S)
Et−1 = PT
24.66 (A) 58.60 (A) 16.75 (A)
24.21 (S) 59.47 (S) 16.32 (S)
Et−1 = FT
13.91 (A) 10.64 (A) 75.45 (A)
16.35 (S) 9.98 (S) 73.67 (S)
The relative frequency of each cell within its row is reported.
(A): Actual (S): Simulated
Table 2.9: Intensive Care Provision by Mother’s Health
Unpaid Paid Paid Caregiver
Baseline Leave Leave I Leave II Allowance
% Intensively caregiving |Hp = healthy 3.64 4.20 4.21 4.24 3.78
% Intensively caregiving |Hp = ADL 13.92 15.78 16.46 17.67 21.07
% Intensively caregiving |Hp = alone 14.58 16.62 18.23 20.66 27.85
Table 2.10: Employment of Women Who Ever Provide Intensive Care
Unpaid Paid Paid Caregiver
Baseline Leave Leave I Leave II Allowance
% Not working 58.94 52.58 51.49 50.17 61.50
% Working part-time 16.32 17.53 17.89 18.13 16.19
% Working full-time 24.74 29.89 30.62 31.70 22.31
Employment status shown for women in periods during and after intensive care provision.
Table 2.11: Employment of Women 62 and Over Who Ever Provide Intensive Care
Unpaid Paid Paid Caregiver
Baseline Leave Leave I Leave II Allowance
% Not working 68.04 62.17 60.94 59.55 70.16
% Working part-time 15.61 16.92 17.37 17.72 15.43
% Working full-time 16.35 20.91 21.69 22.73 14.41
Employment status shown for women in periods during and after intensive care provision.
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Table 2.12: Employment Comparison of Women 62 and Over Who Ever Took a
Leave
Unpaid Leave Paid Leave I Paid Leave II
Takers Takers Takers
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
% Not working 62.02 44.83 60.03 43.29 57.79 41.95
% Working part-time 16.18 20.48 17.06 21.61 17.42 21.84
% Working full-time 21.80 34.69 22.91 35.10 24.79 36.21
Table 2.13: Welfare Comparison of Policy Experiments
Unpaid Paid Paid Paid Paid Caregiver
Leave Leave Ia Leave Ib Leave IIa Leave IIb Allowance
Median value $27,561 $33,434 $39,999 $43,987 $51,567 $31,033
Always caregivers $30,582 $38,241 $45,903 $53,333 $67,005 $36,637
Induced caregivers $25,965 $31,691 $35,948 $39,011 $44,928 $19,818
a Includes those on leave caring for a healthy parent, but not receiving a payment.
b Excludes those on leave caring for a healthy parent.
Always caregivers are those who were intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the baseline.
Induced caregivers are those who were not intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the
baseline.
Table 2.14: Non-Labor Income Estimates
Description Parameter Estimate
Intercept γ0 8.198∗∗∗
(0.047)
HS degree γ1 0.285∗∗∗
(0.034)
Some college γ2 0.601∗∗∗
(0.035)
Married γ3 1.432∗∗∗
(0.044)
Age 62+ γ4 0.813∗∗∗
(0.060)
Married and age 62+ γ5 -0.999∗∗∗
(0.061)
Age 62+ and not working γ6 0.090∗∗
(0.041)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
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Table 2.15: Parental Health Transition Multinomial Logit Estimates
Parameter Healthy→ADL Healthy→Alone Healthy→Dead
Intercept -10.209∗∗∗ -7.959∗∗∗ -7.462∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.725) (0.591)
Mother’s age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Mother HS graduate -0.030 -0.390∗∗∗ -0.145∗
(0.073) (0.103) (0.084)
Parameter ADL→ADL ADL→Alone ADL→Dead
Intercept -4.269∗∗∗ -8.591∗∗∗ -5.493∗∗∗
(0.962) (1.136) (1.072)
Mother’s age 0.066∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Mother HS graduate -0.270∗ -0.291∗ -0.082
(0.146) (0.169) (0.157)
Parameter Alone→ADL Alone→Alone Alone→Dead
Intercept -13.363∗∗∗ -10.276∗∗∗ -11.530∗∗∗
(1.436) (1.095) (1.218)
Mother’s age 0.158∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Mother HS graduate -0.497∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.170) (0.170)
Significance Levels: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Value of Caregiving
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Figure 2.2: Unpaid Leave Results
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Figure 2.3: Paid Leave Results
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